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SUMMARY
This report examines the manaqement of human error in the
cockpit. The principles probably apply as well to other
applications in the aviation realm (e.g. air traffic control,
dispatch, weather, etc.) as well as other high-risk systems
outside of aviation (e.g. shipping, high technology medical
procedures, military operations, nuclear power production).
Management of human error is distinguished from error prevention.
It is a more encompassing term, which includes not only the
prevention of error, but also means of disallowing an error, once
made, from adversely affecting system output. Such techniques
include:
0 Traditional human factors engineering
0 Improvement of feedback and feedforward of information from
system to crew
0 "Error-evident" displays which make erroneous input more
obvious to the crew
O Trapping of errors within a system
0 Goal-sharing between humans and machines (also called
"intent-driven" systems)
0 Paperwork management
0 Behaviorally based approaches, including procedures,
standardization, checklist design, training, cockpit
resource management, etc.
The author stresses "intervention strategies", various means of
error management by intervening into the system. A distinction
is made between two models of intervention, those directed toward
a very specific and well-defined human error (e.g. wrong runway
landings), and those directed toward less defined, often vague
sources of error (e.g. complacency, fatigue).
Fifteen guidelines for the design and implementation of
intervention strategies are included.
I. THE MANAGEMENTOF HUMANERROR
For every evil under the sun,
There is a remedy, or there is none;
If there be one, try and find it,
If there be none, never mind it.
William C. Hazlitt, Enqlish Proverbs, 1869
A. INTRODUCTION
Modern transport aircraft, for all of their sophistication of
design and manufacturing, are still highly vulnerable to
erroneous behavior on the part of crew members. The same is
equally true of other types of aircraft, indeed of human-machine
systems in general, such as nuclear power plants, shipping,
high-technology medicine, and chemical production plants. Some
domains have accident rates that are quite appalling when
compared to aviation. For example, world-wide one merchant ship
a day is lost due to accidental causes. While the focus of this
report is on transport aircraft, the principles derived should
apply to all human-machine systems, especially those which depend
to a large degree on computer-control, often generically
described as "automation."
The vulnerability of a variety of human-machine systems to human
error has been dramatically demonstrated by accidents such as the
crash of Northwest Flight 255 at Detroit in 1987 (National
Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 1988; Lauber, 1989; Wiener,
1989c), the capsize of the sea-going ferry Herald of Free
Enterprise at Zeebruge in 1987 (Department of Transport [U.K.],
1987), the chemical disaster at Bhopal in 1984 (Meshkati, 1988;
Reason, 1990), and the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986
(Meshkati, 1988; Reason, 1990).
There is an ubiquity to such disasters: they are not confined to
aviation or any single domain. Perrow (1984) calls these
disasters "normal accidents"; Wiener (1987b) speaks of the twin
perils of "fallible humans and vulnerable systems." Lautman and
Gallimore's widely quoted study (1987) of world-wide hull loss
accidents of jet transports revealed that approximately 70 per
cent could be attributed to crew error. Additional accidents
could be attributed to human errors committed by others
(maintenance, weather, dispatch, and air traffic control
personnel). Similar figures can be found in studies of general
aviation accidents, military aircraft accidents, and non-aviation
domains.
The author examines the role of human error in aircraft accidents
and incidents, and the methods of managing these occurrences.
The term "management" here implies not only error elimination at
its source, the human operator, but also means of preventing
errors, detecting errors when they occur, and preventing errors
from adversely affecting the system once they do occur.
These methods of error elimination or control will be referred to
as "interventions." The plan by which interventions are
formulated, tested, and implemented is an "intervention
strategy." The author will examine both traditional methods
(e.g. basic human factors in product design, training, and
procedurization) and modern methods which may depend on advanced
computer techniques (e.g. fault tolerant designs).
One of the problems that we must confront is the possibility that
almost anything that is done which impacts the cockpit or cockpit
crew could be considered an intervention strategy. This could be
an action as narrow as the most minor hardware change (e.g.
painting a stripe on some display or control) or procedural
change (reverse the order of two sub-tasks on a checklist). It
could also be an action as broad and encompassing as a
wide-ranging governmental action (e.g. the "sterile cockpit"
rule, to be discussed later), or a major alteration in training
curricula (e.g. the introduction of training in cockpit resource
management [CRM]). Our problem is determining the boundaries of
the term: can any action which is directed toward the management
of human error be considered an intervention strategy?
Interventions can involve the most complex, or the simplest of
devices. The checklist is an example. It is ironic that with
all of the sophisticated and costly devices on board an aircraft,
and those supporting the aircraft through the Air Traffic Control
(ATC) system, the most important guardian of the safety of the
plane and its occupants is a single piece of printed paper, the
checklist. Given this fact, it is somewhat disturbing that prior
to a recent NASA study (Degani and Wiener, 1990), there had been
no systematic research into the human factors of checklists
(Wiener, 1987c).
Traditional Approaches
Airlines typically attack error prevention through their training
programs, standardization of procedures, quality control (e.g.
initial operating experience [IOE], six-month proficiency checks,
line checks, etc.), and printed materials such as manuals and
checklists. Warning and alerting systems on board the aircraft
(e.g. ground proximity warning systems [GPWSs]) and on the ground
(e.g. minimum safe altitude warning systems [MSAWs]) also stand
as sentinels against human error. Note that most of these
systems do not prevent the original error; but they do prevent it
from maturing into an accident or incident.
These approaches have generally proven to be successful, as
evidenced by the steady improvement in air safety (Lautman and
Gallimore, 1987). However it appears that a plateau in accident
rates may have been reached in the last decade, at around 0.3
accidents per million flights (Sears, 1989). Although this
plateau may be extremely low, any non-zero accident rate is
unacceptable to the traveling public, and hence to airlines,
manufacturers, and pilots.
Furthermore, airlines, manufacturers, and government agencies are
also concerned about the plateau effect, due to the fact that if
the accident rate quoted by Sears in hull loss accidents per
million flights remains constant, with expanding traffic, the
absolute number of accidents will increase to 25-30 annually, or
about one every two weeks worldwide (Weener, 1991). Needless to
say, the traveling public, and politicians, are sensitive not to
rates, which may be quite abstract, but to the publicity
surrounding high-visibility accidents when they occur. For this
reason, human error prevention and control has been assigned a
high priority by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and
the manufacturers (Weener, 1990, 1991).
Also there is evidence that air traffic will continue to expand
during the remainder of this decade, and the system may be more
intolerant of error. In recognition of the potential for traffic
increases to generate accidents, there have been proposals to
limit traffic growth to ensure safety (Proctor, 1988). At about
the turn of the century, improvements in the system should be
realized, when the planned modernization of the air traffic
control (ATC) system begins to compensate for growth (FAA, 1991).
Airline safety experts expressed great concern over the forecast
of traffic expansion at a 1988 NASA/FAA/Industry Joint Workshop
on Flight-deck Automation (Norman and Orlady, 1989).
B. THE ADVENT OF MODERNAUTOMATION
The Hiqh Technoloqy Cockpit
Another factor to be considered is the rapid expansion of
automation in the cockpit. Many in the aviation industry have
assumed that automation would remove human error, replacing the
fallible human with unerring devices. The research of Wiener and
Curry, including field studies with airlines bringing highly
automated aircraft on line, suggests that this may be overly
optimistic, and that automation merely changes the nature of
error, and possibly increases the severity of its consequences
(Curry, 1985; Wiener, 1985a, 1985c, 1988a; 1989a,b; Wiener and
Curry, 1980). The same appears to be true in the other
industries mentioned. In brief, computer-controlled flight may
invite large blunders while eliminating the small errors seen in
manual systems. The ASRS reports below are illustrative of some
of the problems of autoflight.
Narrative: We were cleared to cross 40 nm west of LINDEN
VOR to maintain FL270. The captain and I began discuss the
best methods to program the CDU to allow the performance
management system to descend the aircraft. We had a
difference of opinion on how to best accomplish this task-
(since we are trained to use all possible on-board
performance systems). We wanted to use the aircraft's
capabilities to its fullest. As a result, a late descent
was started using conventional autopilot capabilities (vert
spd, max indicated Mach/airspeed, and spd brakes). Near the
end of descent, the aircraft was descending at 340 KIAS and
6000 FPM rate of descent. The aircraft crossed the fix
approximately 250-500 feet high. Unfortunately we made no
call to ATC to advise them of the possibility of not meeting
the require alt/fix. This possible altitude excursion
resulted because: i) The captain, and the F/O had
differences of opinion on how best to program the descent;
A) Both thought their method was the best, the captain's of
programming (fooling) the computer to believe anti-ice would
be used during descent,which starts the descent earlier.
The F/O's of subtracting 5 miles from the nay fix and
programming the computer to cross 5 miles prior to LINDEN at
FL270. B) A minor personality clash between the captain and
the F/O brought about by differences of opinion on general
flying duties, techniques of flying and checklist
discipline. C) Time wasted by both captain and F/O
(especially F/O) in incorrectly programming CDU and FMS for
descent, which obviously wasted time at level flight, which
should have been used for descent. Observation: as a pilot
for a large commercial carrier at its largest base, we
seldom fly with the same cockpit crew member. This normally
does not create a problem. I do, however, feel that with
the new generation glass cockpits being on the property
approximately 6 years, which can cause a bit more difficult
transition than, say month to month cockpit crew change on a
727 or pre-EFIS DC-9. I have flown commercially for I0
years, and have flown 2-man crew for 8 of those i0. The
toughest transition for me is to determine who shares the PF
and PNF duties. This historically (3 years) has been the
most difficult when the other crew member has transferred
from a 3-man cockpit to a 2-man "glass cockpit." This is
especially pertinent when the crew member has been on a
3-man crew for a number of years. As F/O, when you are the
PNF, you accomplish your normal duties. However, often
times when one is the PF, the F/O also has to do the PNF
duties because the other crew member has not been used to
doing the PNF duties to the extent that it is required on
2-man cockpits, whether they be conventional or EFIS. This
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obviously can lead to a myriad of problems. Add weather or
an airport such as Washington National, LaGuardia, or Orange
County, and problems can accelerate with alarming rapidity.
(ASRS No. 122778)
Narrative: Aircraft was coupled to autopilot and autopilot
was armed for the ILS (8L at Atlanta). Aircraft intercepted
and captured localizer at approximately 15 nm from airfield,
aircraft at 5000'. I identified localizer. As per company
procedures captain rotated heading (HDG) select knob to 340
deg for missed approach HDG, but unknown to either of us,
the multifunction knob was pushed in far enough to activate
"HDG Hold". I did not notice the flight mode annunciator
window change From "LOC TRK" to "HDG HLD". Of course, the
ADI (flight director) display _remained as before with the
pitch bar giving altitude hold at 5000' And the bank bar
still centered but centered because we were On HDG not
localizer. Obviously we gradually started to drift right.
The HSI (nay display) was selected on map mode (20 mile
scale). On this scale a small deviation off localizer is too
small to detect. I monitored the glide slope (raw data
display) and saw it descend through the flight director
pitch bar. I looked at the flight mode annunciator (FMA) and
realized we were no longer armed for the ILS. I immediately
announced to the captain and disconnected the autopilot to
start descent and selected arc mode on the nav display. I
saw we were full scale localizer deflection so I put in
about a 15 deg correction to course. At that moment Atlanta
Approach called to tell us we were drifting into the
parallel ILS course and he told us to maintain 4500' until
established. (He also gave us a HDG to correct). I leveled
at 4700' and as I did the localizer centered up and the ILS
was resumed uneventfully. Having map mode in HSI instead of
arc does not make a localizer deviation immediately obvious.
Lack of continuous cross-check of FMA by pilots is a factor.
Hdg select knob doubles as HDG hold button and an
imperceptible extra push in on it activates HDG hold. To
correct the problem: fly ILS with arc (or rose) in map to
make deviations immediately obvious. Additionally,
multifunction knobs should not be accepted on aircraft. It
is simply too easy at night when you are tired or distracted
to activate the wrong function. (We have 3 multifunction
knobs where different functions are activated depending on
how far in you push the knob. It can be very tricky
sometimes). (ASRS No. 141226)
However, the evidence is not entirely supportive of the
Wiener-Curry hypothesis of automation and error severity. In a
recent simulation study which compared performance of crews in a
specially designed LOFT (line oriented flight training) session
in two aircraft in the same family, one with a traditional
cockpit (DC-9-30) and one with an advanced technology ("glass")
cockpit (MD-88), there were no statistically significant
differences in the severity of errors committed by the crews of
the two aircraft (Wiener, Chidester, Kanki, Palmer, Curry, and
Gregorich, 1991) This result was confirmed in two independent
analyses of error severity.
Contributions of Coqnitive Psycholoqy and Systems Enqineerinq
Human error has excited the interest of cognitive psychologists
and systems engineers inthe last decade, and some very
imaginative and creative ideas have resulted (reviewed in Nagel,
1988). The nature of human error has been explored by such
experts as Norman (1983, 1984), Rouse and Rouse (1983),
Rasmussen, Duncan, and Leplat (1987), Reason (1990), Moray
(1988), Woods (1989), and others. Several have developed models
and taxonomies of human error (e.g. Rouse and Rouse, 1983;
Rasmussen, 1981; and Norman, 1981). These were reviewed by
Rogers, Logan, and Boley (1989). Recently, two books on the
psychology of human error have appeared (Reason, 1990; Senders
and Moray, 1991).
Insightful as the writings of cognitive psychologists may be,
they are often highly abstract, and their applicability to
aviation is not always clear. However, in recent years some of
the leading authors have written far more concretely about
cognitive processes and error control in aviation and other
domains, notably Norman (1983, i990), Hutchins and Klausen (in
press), Rasmussen and Vicente (1989), and Woods (1986). Despite
this, most of the authors have been content to explain the
cognitive etiology and psychodynamics of human error, but have
been somewhat slower to examine solutions or intervention
strategies. Norman (1990), in discussing the "problem with
automation" (lack of feedback), has suggested solutions, but
mostly by implication. Rouse's writings on how computer
technology might play a part (e.g. fault tolerant systems) has
given designers some guidance (1990). More will be said about
the potential contributions of cognitive psychology and
intelligent computer methods in Chapter IV.
C. PURPOSE AND LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY
Purpose of This Study
In this report the author examines possible sources of error
experienced by humans operating complex systems, and the
resources that can be brought to bear on these problems. The
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goal is to match methods (resources) with demands (potential
errors), to determine whether an effective error intervention
strategy can be derived (Wiener, 1989a).
A set of guidelines for the design and evaluation of intervention
strategies is proposed throughout the text, and collected in
Appendix I. The guidelines provide a "template" against which a
proposal can be held. A perfect fit will never be found. The
author of any proposed intervention should hope to find a good,
or at least satisfactory, fit.
GUIDELINE NO. 1
In proposing an intervention strategy, one should ask "is
this intervention necessary? Is there a well-defined
problem or set of problems that it can prevent or reduce?"
It is not sufficient to justify a proposed intervention by
merely saying that it is "good for safety."
Each proposed method of intervention (e.g. error-evident
displays) should be examined with respect to its feasibility,
applicability, costs, and possible short-comings (e.g. creating a
problem elsewhere in the system). Take the following examples.
.
Some error-reducing systems tend to generate other errors,
including false alarms. The effectiveness of the early
models of the GPWS was marred by high false alarm rates, as
well as crew uncertainty about which mode was responsible
for triggering the alert (Wiener and Curry, 1980). In the
aggregate, GPWS has proven to be highly effective as an
intervention against controlled flight into terrain (CFIT)
accidents which plagued the industry in the 1970s (Loomis
and Porter, 1981; Weener, 1990; Wiener, 1977). The recent
crash of an Air Inter A-320 near Strasbourg, France
(Lenorovitz, 1992) rekindled the debate over whether the
GPWS should be mandatory for passenger aircraft
,
Voice-warning systems can be used to alert crews to
hazardous conditions; they also intrude on the cockpit
atmosphere and possibly interfere with intra-crew and radio
communications.
.
Increasingly crews are encouraged (though not required by
FARs) to give detailed readback of takeoff clearances,
including stating the runway for aircraft cleared for
takeoff. This is an effective cross-check against ATC or
crew error, but not without a cost. Any added voice
communication requirement potentially increases frequency
congestion, which in turn can contribute to communication
error. It can also be a source of error.
Limitations of This Study
For the purposes of this study, I have considered only those
interventions directed toward the manaqement of human error and
the prevention of accidents and incidents. An entire class of
interventions which are vitally important to aviation safety will
not be addressed. Those are the measures directed toward events
that occur in the "post-crash" phase of an accident. They are
designed to ameliorate injury and prevent death to the aircraft
occupants. Interventions in this area would include such
measures as strengthening aircraft floors and seat mounts,
improvement of restraint devices, evacuation routes, markings,
lighting, and procedures, cabin personnel training, fire
suppression, containment of loose objects in the cabin, and many
others. Also, this report will be confined to management of
errors on the flight-deck, although many of the same principles
could apply elsewhere in the aviation system (e.g. air traffic
control [ATC], aviation weather, dispatch, passenger cabin, and
maintenance), as well in as in other high-risk domains.
I have also excluded from consideration interventions aimed at
upper management (including government), for example the
possibility of airlines rebuilding their schedules to reduce the
likelihood of fatigue, and thus presumably human error. Also
excluded from consideration will be pre-employment selection, as
this is not clearly an error-management technique.
Orqanization of This Report
For ease of reference, chapters are denoted by Roman numbers, and
tables and figures within a chapter by sequential Arabic numbers.
Thus, for example, the first figure in Chapter IV would be
referred to as Figure IV-I. The appendices are denoted
sequentially by Arabic numerals, and notes (Chapter VII) are
cited by square brackets and Arabic numerals, e.g. [2].
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II. HUMANERRORAND INTERVENTION
A. LINES OF DEFENSE
In this section the concept of lines of defense against human
error will be introduced. Lines of defense are seen as a series
of imperfect, cascaded filters, each of which may stop an error,
or allow it to pass. For any human error or class of errors,
there may be a unique set and order of the lines of defense. The
purpose of an intervention strategy is to strengthen one or more
of the lines of defense. In this chapter the author will discuss
various generic opportunities for interventions. Intervention
strategies will be covered in detail in subsequent chapters.
On August 16, 1987 Northwest Flight 255, an MD-82, attempted to
take off from runway 3C at Detroit. It struggled off the end of
the runway, then attained an altitude of approximately 40 feet
before striking a light stanchion in a parking lot, and crashing
onto a freeway. After a lengthy investigation, the NTSB (1988)
concluded that the crew had taken off without slats and flaps
deployed, resulting in diminished takeoff performance. An
elaborate takeoff warning device, which should have furnished the
crew with a voice warning of the misconfiguration, failed to
activate, for reasons unknown. The accident's chain of causation
was complex, to say the least. In many ways this accident
represents a veritable catalog of human factors (Lauber, 1989).
In November of that year the Board's public hearing was held in
Detroit. The author was invited to testify as to human factors
in general, and automation and warning devices in particular. As
part of the testimony, the author proposed six "lines of defense"
against human error. These were seen as being essentially
arrayed in series, such that any one of the defenses could negate
any error and prevent an incident, accident, or undesirable
condition (Wiener, 1987c). These are listed in Table II-i and
depicted in Figure II-l. Schwartz (1990) proposed a similar
concept which he called the "safety chain."
Note that the items below, and particularly their order, are not
proposed as "universal". The order of these lines of defense was
proposed by the author, primarily with avoidance of the
consequences of a no-slats/flaps takeoff in mind. The order is
open to debate, and the reader may propose some other order of
the lines of defense, or even other defenses. Furthermore, the
order, as well as the inclusion at all, may depend somewhat on
the error being defended against. For example, Defense No. 5 may
be inappropriate in many cases. In other cases (e.g. altitude
deviations), the anomaly is most often detected by an ATC
controller (Degani, Chappell, and Hayes, 1991). The order of
the lines of defense against a midair collision are considerably
different from those that may be established for stall avoidance.
I0
Figure II-i emphasizes the serial, or cascaded structure of the
lines of defense.
TABLE II-I. Lines of defense against human error.(From Wiener, 1987c)
I ,
,
3.
,
5.
,
Execution of normal procedures and airmanship, backed up
by human vigilance, - by the responsible crew member(s).
Detection of abnormal condition by other crew members.
Secondary indications or displays (e.g. sounds, vibrations
or other stimuli impinging on the cockpit that might
indicate errors).
Warning and alerting devices.
Detection of error conditions by persons external to the
cockpit (ATC, other aircraft crews, persons on ground, cabin
crew or passengers, etc.).
Machines that take action on their own (e.g. alpha floor
protection against stall in high technology aircraft;
autoslats and stick-pushers for stall avoidance and
recovery).
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Figure II-l. Lines of defense against human error.
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Before discussing interventions, one point needs to be made
clear. The first line of defense against human error is, and
always will be, product design. This dictum is discussed at
several places within this report. Both the author and Norman
put the burden on the designer of hardware. Norman (1983),
writing on human error, states, "There is little need for most of
these errors. Most are system induced, a result of inappropriate
system design." Wiener, testifying before Congress (1988b),
spoke of his "Iron Law", that if equipment is designed correctly
for human use in the first place, the cost is high, but it is
paid only once. If poor design must be compensated for in
training departments and operations, the price must be paid every
day. And what is worse, with weak, potentially error-inducing
designs, one cannot be sure that when the chips are down, the
correct responses will be made.
The aim of intervention is to strengthen lines of defense at any
barrier, or any combination of barriers, and to insert additional
lines of defense where possible. It may be helpful at this point
to give some examples of interventions, as well as of places
where intervention is needed.
B. INTERVENTION STRATEGIES - EXAMPLES
GUIDELINE NO. 2
Never implement an intervention or procedure that you feel
that the crews will not follow. (This is similar to the
military dictum of "never give an order that you do not
expect to be carried out.")
Intervention Throuqh Procedures
One of the carriers studied by the author has a number of
procedures that must be completed upon climbing through i0,000
feet. In one aircraft, which has high climb performance, it is
very possible to climb rapidly from I0,000, where these duties
are initiated, through FL 180 (18,000 feet) where an altimeter
adjustment is required (in U.S. airspace). This procedure could
easily be ignored in the midst of a demanding workload. It would
appear that some of these duties could be reassigned to other
points in the flight (and on the checklist), possibly to FL 180
or above, to avoid this potentially serious error. Note that
this is not workload reduction: no steps are omitted. This is
workload manaqement: the temporal redistribution of workload,
with the goal being error control. Workload management, or lack
of it, is illustrated by the following ASRS report.
Narrative: passing ARNES on CIVET 2 profile descent, we both
(2 man crew) thought we were cleared after passing FUELR for
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the 25L ILS approach with a sidestep to runway 24R. Approach
later asked if we had the airport and we reported we did and
we both thought we were cleared for a visual to runway 24R.
We switched the ILS to 24R and turned in that direction. Alt
was 4000' and descending, then Approach told us to turn 20
deg left and that we had traffic to our right. He apparently
was turning into runway 24R. Approach said our original
clearance was for runway 25R, not for runway 24R. The rest
of the approach and landing was normal on runway 25R.
Apparently we misheard the clearance. Contributing factors:
tuning in a runway and being forced to change to another
runway while trying to make altitude restrictions etc. Also
flying an automated, glass cockpit aircraft in this
environment pushes workload to the limit, when having to
change runways on final, forcing you to reprogram the
computer, re-tune the nav radios and change VHF freq and
change charts. It becomes very easy to misunderstand
clearances. Also no one had time to look for other traffic.
(ASRS Report No. 167993)
Intervention Throuqh Requlation
An example of intervention through government regulation can be
found in the so-called "sterile cockpit" rule. In the 1970s the
airline industry was plagued by a rash of what came to be called
"controlled flight into terrain" (CFIT) accidents (Ruffell Smith,
1968; Weener, 1990; Wiener, 1977). In several cases, the cockpit
voice recorder indicated a high degree of casual conversation and
persiflage in the cockpit, implying a neglect of essential
duties. As a result, the FAA promulgated Federal Aviation
Regulation (FAR) 121.542, which decreed that while moving on the
ground under its own power, or flying below 10,000 feet (MSL),
the cockpit was to be "sterile", meaning no non-pertinent
conversation could take place. During sterile periods, there can
be no entry into the cockpit by the cabin crew for non-essential
reasons. Unfortunately, it is not always clear to the cabin crew
members what constitutes a warrant to enter the cockpit during
sterile periods (Chute and Wiener, in preparation).
The sterile cockpit rule is largely unenforceable, but it does
set the tone for a business-like atmosphere in the critical
phases of flight, and sets a standard for cockpit behavior at
critical times of operation. Some cockpit voice recorder
readouts in recent accidents have revealed less than assiduous
devotion to the rule (NTSB, 1988, 1989). It will always be
controversial since it is invasive on the cockpit working
atmosphere and self-expressions of the crew. Although there are
no statistics to support the efficacy of the sterile cockpit
rule, it is generally seen as a plus for safety. Its benefits
not limited to CFIT accidents. With the growing concern over
ground collisions at airports, the sterile cockpit rule probably
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plays a large part in preventing distractive behavior while
taxiing.
GUIDELINE NO. 3
Politically inspired interventions should be resisted.
Although the motivation and intention of the Congress may be
correct, legislative bodies do not have the technical
expertise to specify and evaluate safety interventions, and
at the very least their solutions may involve technically
infeasible deadlines (e.g. ELT, GPWS, and TCAS). These may
lead to immature hardware and software being installed in
aircraft, with the result that effective intervention is
delayed rather than hastened. This is particularly true in
those cases where Congressional interventions come in the
wake of a tragic accident, and political leaders (and
possibly their constituents) may feel that the FAA and
industry are not moving as quickly as they might.
Intervention Throuqh Hardware
The author has already mentioned the ground proximity warning
system (GPWS), which was mandated by the U.S. Congress as its
solution to the CFIT accidents. The early models of the GPWS had
their own operational problems, for example high false alarm
rates, and alarm modes which were difficult to interpret. In
spite of its shaky beginning, the merits of the GPWS have been
documented (Loomis and Porter, 1981; Weener, 1990). These authors
have shown that in those countries in which the GPWS is required,
CFIT accidents have been dramatically reduced, and have virtually
disappeared in the U.S. Unfortunately, in other parts of the
world GPWS is not required, and each airline may decide whether
to equip its fleet with the device. The crash of the Air Inter
A-320 near Strasbourg, France in January 1992 emphasized this
regrettable fact.
A simple device provides another example of hardware intervention
against an all-too-common human error of yesteryear.
i) The device. Conventional aircraft of the World War II era
could not be safely left on the ground with their control
surfaces unsecured, since wind gusts could move them violently,
causing structural damage. As a countermeasure to this, external
locks, in the form of crude, V-shaped wedges made of wood, were
manually inserted onto the control surfaces, locking them in
neutral position.
2) The problem. The reader can immediately see the potential
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for disaster. It was not at all infrequent for aircraft to
attempt takeoff with the gust locks still installed, usually
resulting in a crash off the end of the runway. Countermeasures
were devised, such as long red ribbons attached to the locks to
make them more conspicuous on the ground, checklist items
requiring a response that the locks had been removed, as well as
a pre-takeoff check item that required moving the controls
through full travel, which would be impossible with the locks
installed. Still aircraft managed to get past the lines of
defense and take off with gust locks set (NTSB, 1976, 1978).
Figure II-2a. Gust lock blocking throttle on C-131 aircraft.
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Figure II-2b. Possible lines of defense against
taking off with external gust locks installed.
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As aircraft grew in size, the control surfaces were often out of
reach of the ground crew, and as a result an internal mechanical
lock as installed, with the control in the cockpit. The crew
would disengage it before taxiing. But the same problem
persisted: the crew could still initiate a takeoff with the
controls in the locked position.
3) A hardware intervention. In the Convair 240/340/440 series
(military designation C-131), designed in the late 1940s, a
cockpit control, connected to the control surfaces, replaced the
wooden exterior gust locks. The gust lock control was placed on
the throttle quadrant forward of the throttles - it was released
and moved forward to unlock the control surfaces. To ensure that
this would be done prior to takeoff, a simple but ingenious
intervention was devised. A small triangular block was attached
to the top of the gust lock control, pointing toward the throttle
levers (see Figure II-2a). With the controls locked, the block
prevented the throttles from being opened past approximately
field barometric pressure. In short, the takeoff was
mechanically prevented -- the engines simply could not develop
anything close to takeoff power with the gust lock handle in
place. The intervention was simple, reliable, and economical.
Another example of a hardware intervention is the altitude
alerter. Not too many years ago aircraft had no altitude alerter
of any kind: the crew depended on short-term memory (STM) to
store the target altitude. Since STM is notoriously
undependable, the first level of hardware intervention was to add
an altitude reminder. The altitude reminder was essentially a
digital "scratch pad" into which the crew entered their target
altitude; it resided on the panel as a visual reminder, and had
no alerting function. This was an improvement over human STM,
but was still far from effective in preventing altitude
deviations. The next step was make this device an altitude
alerter. A certain number of feet (the actual number of feet
varying considerably across types and models) prior to the
altitude set in the window, an alerting signal is emitted. This
was usually an aural tone, but on some models such as the MD-80
it was only a small amber light on the altimeter. The trigger
point for the alerting signal has never been standardized, and
may vary considerably even within a company's fleet. (See
Chapter III, Section A on cockpit standardization)
GUIDELINE NO. 4
Any intervention must be carefully examined to ensure that
it does not interfere with other systems, diminish safety
elsewhere, or create a problem for the flight crew or other
personnel. For example, the early models of the
Congressionally mandated emergency locator transmitter (ELT)
beacon, which was legislated into service before the
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industry felt that it had been properly tested, contained
batteries that leaked acid and damaged the structure of the
aircraft. Another example is the ever-present temptation to
add items to the aircraft checklist. Expanding a checklist
may decrease the probability that the checklist procedure
will be conducted properly (Degani and Wiener, 1990).
A final example is the traffic alert collision avoidance
system (TCAS). While the TCAS is undoubtedly a valuable
intervention in collision avoidances, especially in
protecting again VFR traffic, it does create additional
workload and particularly "heads-down" time, which is
already recognized as an undesirable by-product of cockpit
automation. In such a case, a balance of hazards must be
recognized, and secondary interventions may be required.
The potential value of the altitude alerter may be found in the
following two ASRS reports:
Narrative: We requested and received what for us is a non
standard TWR to TWR clearance from ATL to MGM, climb and
maintain 4000', expect 10000. When II DME from the ATL
VORTAC the controller asked us our altitude as we were going
through 5000' Leveled at 5000' and said to the departure
controller he thought we had been cleared to i0000' We had
not. The dep controller said to maintain 5000'. We did not
hear him give any immediate hdgs or alts to other aircraft
so we thought there was no immediate conflict. We subse-
quently climbed to i0000' and continued the flight w/o
incident. My captain had just upgraded from F/O on our
company's Part 121 aircraft, which had an altitude alerter
installed. Evidently he had subconsciously become dependent
on that device because all he has to do as the PF is
maintain HDG, altitude and airspeed. I was heads down in the
cockpit writing down the dep times in the utilization log
instead of monitoring my captain's performance. This is my
second altitude bust in i0 months with this commuter, and
both times the captain was flying. Both times I was heads
down doing paperwork required by the company, or talking to
the company on the second radio. From now on, I will only
talk to the company once we are at cruising alt. I was an
fighter weapons system officer for i0 years and never had an
altitude bust. I have been with this commuter for I0 months
and I've had 2! If the capts I fly with aren't going to
concentrate on flying and stop being so blase about the
whole thing, it is destined to happen again. I am
frustrated. I don't want to be violated and become
unemployable by a major airline. I thought after the first
altitude bust it would never happen again, but it did and I
allowed myself to be distracted just like the first time.
The bottom line is that I have to watch these fallible human
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beings like a hawk. Supplemental info from ASRS No. 144128:
I was climbing to 10000' as I thought was had been cleared.
This type of occurrence could, I think, be almost eliminated
by the mandatory installation of an altitude alerting sys in
commuter aircraft operating under FAR 135. (ASRS No.
143963)
Narrative: I departed DEA on a routine scheduled flight to
YKM. We were clred to 5000' and inadvertently went through
this altitude by 2000'. My F/O was flying at the time. I was
trying to ident a radar return for weather avoidance. I gave
him the 1000' call required in our ops specs but he was also
involved in the radar tracking of a thunderstorm we were
trying to avoid. Consequently, we flew right through our
assigned alt. The aircraft we fly are not equipped with
altitude alerters which would have prevented this from
happening. Recommend that aircraft like these require
alerters to prevent this, which will continue to occur
because we are only human. It might just save lives.
No. 145134)
(ASRS
In conclusion, hardware interventions are probably the easiest to
evaluate. Regulatory intervention such as the sterile cockpit
rule is far more difficult. We further note that an altitude
alerter, even correctly set, is no guarantee of a successful
leveloff. The ASRS database is replete with examples of crews
that failed to hear (process) the aural alert, and busted an
altitude.
Intervention Throuqh Documentation
In this report we shall use the term "documentation" to refer a
variety of devices employed by the crews, including manuals,
checklists, performance charts, flight plans, weather reports,
and documents and paperwork of all sorts.
This definition of documentation is consistent with Edwards
(1988, page ii), use of the term "software" in his well known
SHEL model (software, hardware, environment, and liveware) as
"...comprising rules, regulations, laws, orders, standard
operating procedures, customs, practices, and habits which govern
the manner in which the system operates and in which the
information within it is organized. This is software, much - but
not all - of which will be set down in a collection of
documents". The present author prefers to use the term
"documentation" rather than "software," due to the latter's
customary usage meaning computer programs.
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An example of intervention throuqh computer software. In
modern "glass cockpit" aircraft, a vast amount of information is
processed and stored in the flight management computer (FMC).
This information can be displayed to the crew in text, numeric,
and graphic form on selected pages of the control-display unit
(CDU), the glass instrument panels, and elsewhere, Some of the
information is "automatically" displayed, requiring no request
from the crew (e.g. the wind vector on the navigation display);
other information is available in the FMC on demand through pilot
selection of the correct CDU page. The display of certain
valuable information, such as suitable emergency airfields, is
switch selectable. Finally, if the FMC detects an abnormal
computer condition, a brief message can be displayed in the
"scratch pad" line of the CDU, and the pilot is alerted on two
other displays that an FMC message awaits him. An example would
be a request for a waypoint "not in the database."
GUIDELINE NO. 5
If the intervention strategy involves displays, the
information should be easily interpretable. For example,
the early models of the ground proximity warning system
(GPWS) often created confusion as to which trigger mode was
responsible for the alarm. Later models of the GPWS
improved the situation by identifying alert modes.
Intervention Throuqh Linquistic Procedures
Miscommunication between aircrews and ATC controllers has long
recognized as a leading source of human error (see Billings and
Cheaney, 1981). It has also been an area rich in potential for
interventions. Examples are the restricted or contrived lexicon
(e.g. the phrase "say again" hails from military communications,
where it was mandated in order to avoid confusing the words
"repeat" and "retreat"); a phonetic alphabet ("alpha", "bravo",
etc.); and stylized pronunciations (e.g., "nine-er" due to the
confusion of the spoken words "nine" and "five"). Prince and
Salas (1993) discuss the need for a standard vocabulary during
military operations.
As a result of the tragic ground collision between two B-747s at
Tenerife in 1977 (Spanish Ministry of Transport and
Communications, 1978), blamed largely on miscommunications
between the tower and the two aircraft, the FAA encouraged
controllers to restrict the word "cleared" to two circumstances:
"cleared to takeoff" and "cleared to land", although other uses
of the word is not prohibited (ATC Handbook (FAA 7110.65F). In
the past a pilot might be cleared to start engines, cleared to
push back, or cleared to cross a runway. Now the controller
typically says, "cross runway 27", and "pushback approved",
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reserving the word "cleared" for its most flight-critical use.
Likewise, the term "cleared" was dropped from the "position and
hold" instruction for the aircraft first in line for takeoff.
Previously controllers said "[aircraft identifier] cleared to
line up and hold." Because an aircraft in number-one position at
the stop line was anticipating takeoff clearance, there were
occasional incidents where a takeoff was initiated at this
command. Now the controller simply instructs the number-one
aircraft, "position and hold" (ATC Handbook 7110.65F).
The need for linguistic intervention never ends, as trouble can
appear in unlikely places. For example, pilots reading back
altimeter settings often abbreviate by omitting the first digit
from the number of inches of barometric pressure. For example,
29.97 (in. Hg.) is read back "niner niner seven". Since baro
settings are given in millibars in many parts of the world,
varying above and below the standard value of 1013, the readback
"niner niner seven" above might be interpreted reasonably but
inaccurately as 997 millibars. The obvious intervention strategy
would be to require full readback of all four digits when working
in inches.
A long-range intervention and contribution to safety would be to
accept the more common (in aviation) English system of
measurement, eliminating meters, kilometers, and millibars once
and for all. Whether English or metric forms should both be used
in aviation of course is argumentative, and raises sensitive
cultural issues. At this time the English system clearly
prevails, as does the English language. In some parts of the
world units are mixed: ATC instructions and instrumentation are
in feet, weather is reported in meters. In 1983 an Air Canada
B-767 ran out of fuel and made a successful dead-stick landing on
a small obscure airfield (Ott, 1983). The fuel instrumentation
and calculations of most of the planes in the fleet were in
pounds; this particular plane was instrumented in metric
(kilograms of fuel). An error in conversion occurred, that
resulted in insufficient fuel on board by a factor of roughly
2.2, the conversion constant between kilos and pounds.
Intervention By Hardware Retrofit and Redesiqn
On June 30, 1987, a Delta Air Lines 767 departed Los Angeles
International to the west, bound for Cincinnati (Preble, 1987).
At approximately I000 feet above the Pacific, the crew received
an EICAS advisory message that the right electronic engine
control (EEC) was inoperative. At approximately 1600 feet the
captain dealt with the message by retarding the right throttle
and reaching for the EEC switch. Instead he grasped the fuel
control switch, shutting down the right engine. He then did the
same thing to the left engine. The captain realized his error
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and placed the fuel control switches back on, selected flight
ignition, and restarted both engines. During the power loss, the
aircraft descended to approximately 500 feet above the Pacific
Ocean. The climb was resumed and they flew to their destination
without further incident.
Following this incident, the FAA directed the airlines to
relocate the EEC switches to the upper left panel, over the
captain's position. This was probably an effective intervention,
but others were possible. The captain later admitted that he
never called for the checklist when the EEC message appeared, and
never told the first officer what he was doing. Ironically, no
immediate action was required in response to the EICAS message.
As a result of this and other incidents related to crew
coordination that occurred the same year, Delta intervened
aggressively by developing a crew resource management (CRM)
program for its 7000 pilots (Byrnes and Black, 1993). Checklist
discipline was stressed at all levels of training. Procedures
and checklists were later redesigned. The role of CRM training
as an intervention strategy will be discussed elsewhere in this
report. A more complete discussion of CRM can be found in
various chapters in Wiener, Kanki, and Helmreich, 1993). The
effect of both the absence and presence of CRM training in
certain accidents investigated by the NTSB is discussed by Kayten
(1993). (Note that CRM also stands for cockpit resource
management).
GUIDELINE NO. 6
Any design, hardware or software, should conform to accepted
standards of human factors. The designer of the
intervention strategy should be mindful of published design
guidelines, whether they are considered official or not [see
Wiener and Curry, 1980 for automation guidelines (reprinted
in Appendix 2 of this report); Degani and Wiener, 1990 for
checklist guidelines (Appendix 3); Williges, Williges, and
Fainter (1988) for guidelines for human-computer interaction
in aviation), and Wickens (1984) for general guidelines for
automated systems]
Difficult Interventions
Intervention strategies (which meet the guidelines expressed in
Appendix i) are not always apparent; remedies may be elusive.
One example is runway incursions and ground collisions, a
recognized weak spot in the air safety mosaic, where the lines of
defense can easily be breached. In December 1990, a collision
occurred on the ground at Detroit Metropolitan Airport when a
Northwest DC-9 crew became disoriented taxiing in low visibility
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and entered a runway in front of a company B-727 that was taking
off (NTSB, 1991; Fotos, 1991). Only two months later a collision
between a landing USAir B-737 and a Skywest Fairchild Metroliner
occurred in Los Angeles (see Appendix i, Guideline No. 7)
(Dornheim, 1991).
Ground collisions present an extraordinarily difficult area for
intervention. They are somewhat resistant to technology. Those
technologies that could be implemented (e.g. stop lights at the
runway threshold) probably violate the guidelines contained in
this report, since they may themselves provide an opportunity for
human error. The report below is instructive.
Narrative: on taxi in, last leg of a 4 day trip, I contacted
ground control and reported clear of i0. Ground said to hold
short of 22 at Charlie. I read back same. During taxi the
captain said "after landing," meaning complete the after
landing checklist. I completed the checklist, called
operations and advised them we were on the ground (a
required call) and then called Ramp Control to confirm our
gate. I looked back up at the captain (my eyes were down and
right toward the radio control panel) and said, "gate is
confirmed and we are still to hold short of 22! I reminded
him again because I noticed we were not slowing down. He
acknowledged me with a nod. I once again diverted my
attention to the radio control panel (down and right), maybe
for 3 or 4 secs. When I looked up, Ground Control said,
"Aircraft XX, hold short of 22." At that time we were within
5' of RWY 22. The captain slammed on the brakes. A small
twin engine plane crossed directly in front of us on a
takeoff roll. Had this been a larger aircraft with a greater
wing span, there would have been contact! Many times
captains bellow out commands. Almost immediately, "after
landing checklist," meaning, "I want this right now!" During
this approximately 1 minute taxi prior to reaching RWY 22, I
was out of the loop three times--solely with non-safety
related communications and a checklist that could easily and
should have been accomplished only after clearance and on
the ramp. I had to leave RND freq twice and read the after
landing checklist. Our abrupt stop was beyond the hold short
line. If RND Control had not told us again, our 2 aft would
have met at the intersection of RWY 22 and taxiway Charlie.
F/O's need to remain in the loop and not be involved in
non-safety related communications until in a safe zone.
(ASRS No. 145483)
Many post-accident suggestions for interventions involve extreme
limitations on ATC, which might reduce the already critically
limited runway capacities at major airports, creating a potential
safety problem in the process. The example cited in Guideline
No. 7 speaks to this point.
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GUIDELINE NO. 7
All interventions should be examined for any adverse effects
on air traffic control _TC). For example, shortly after
the accident at Los Angeles where a USAir B-737 landed on
top of a Skywest Metroliner awaiting release for takeoff on
Runway 24L, it was suggested that towers discontinue their
practice of allowing an aircraft to "line up and hold" on an
active runway, remaining instead short of the runway until
cleared for takeoff. To do so would impose immense delays
on the system, for a questionable safety benefit. After
reconsideration, this proposal was dropped.
This is not to say that interventions, some of them quite low on
the technology scale, could not improve the situation. These
would include standardization of signs and markings, improved
maintenance of signs, markings, lighting, and paint stripes, and
better guidance devices for very low visibility conditions. A
speaker at an Air Transport Association (ATA) meeting in San
Diego in May 1991, drew unrestrained applause when he suggested
that the situation at most airports could be improved by "a few
buckets of paint." The same month the Air Line Pilot, a
publication of ALPA, published an article entitled, "A can of
paint and a brush" on the same topic (Steenblik, 1991).
C. IS THERE AN INTERVENTION STRATEGY FOR EVERY PROBLEM?
The problem of the unbounded use of the term "intervention
strategy" has already been raised. Is everything that is done,
every design change, every measure that is taken in the name of
safety, every new installation of hardware, or documentation, or
policy, regulation, or practice, an intervention?
This question does not have an easy answer. Certainly we can
find interventions that have little or nothing to do with safety
or human error. These are measures which may improve the
operation economically (e.g. fuel conservation; public address
announcements to the cabin during flight, etc.). From there we
might consider areas that improve the smooth flow of information
on the flight deck: minor paperwork changes, ACARS data link for
routine company traffic, and elimination or relocation of
company-required radio calls. These are interventions -- they
are brought to the cockpit to solve a perceived problem, and it
is not easy to say which are safety related and which are not.
Clearly, most routine PA announcements to the passengers are not.
However, measures which improve information flow may also reduce
workload, and, in most cases, workload reduction can be linked to
safety.
Some interventions are difficult to classify. For example, the
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Department of Transportation has recently promulgated an
elaborate, controversial, and costly intervention strategy aimed
at detecting pilots who take dangerous drugs (DiNunno, 1989).
This has angered the pilot community and raised certain
constitutional questions, as well as less legalistic questions of
fair play. Above all, the use of random drug testing calls into
question whether the resources expended by this program are
justified by the magnitude of the problem.
GUIDELINE NO. 8
Preferably the intervention strategy should be non-punitive.
It should not place _the crew at an added risk of violation
or other punitive action.
Likewise we must ask if there is an intervention for everything,
for every form of human error? Perhaps the question is better
stated: for every human factors problem, is there an
intervention strategy that meets the requirements of Appendix I?
The problems of runway and taxiway incursions and the hazard of
ground collisions has already been cited as an example of
difficult areas for intervention. Others are perhaps even more
difficult, due to their unpredictability and low probability.
For example, there is a remote possibility of a psychiatric
episode occurring to a crew member, which could endanger the
aircraft. It has happened before (Dahlby, 1982). Preemptive
intervention strategies would include psychiatric screening prior
to hiring, and periodic reevaluation of flight crews, perhaps in
connection with their semi-annual physicals. Prediction of an
sudden episode in an individual whose psychiatric condition is
well masked, or not previously existent, is extremely difficult.
Intervention at the time of the episode would require immediate
action on the part of fellow crew member(s), and may be
particularly difficult in a two-pilot cockpit.
One can conceive of other difficult areas for intervention;
errors of judgment (e.g. which direction to go to circumnavigate
a thunderstorm; whether to accept a flawed though legal
aircraft); highly unacceptable behavior such as deliberate,
inappropriate silencing of warning and alerting systems; errors
of perception and intent (e.g. wrong airport or wrong runway
landings, a problem that has had a remarkable persistence). Note
that the last example is one of those errors where Line of
Defense No. 5 (detection by persons external to the crew) may
provide some protection. The brief ASRS report below illustrates
a helping hand from outside the cockpit.
Narrative: during ILS approach to RWY 16R TWR advised of a
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low altitude alert, just as I was breaking out of the
clouds. I scanned everything only to find an "off" flag on
the glide slope. I leveled off and only began descent when
the RWY and VASI became visible. There was much turbulence
and rain and I never noticed the problem. I landed
uneventfully. The next time it appears I am flying a perfect
ILS glide slope in rain and turbulence, I will start
looking around. (ASRS No. 143781)
Clearly intervention strategies are not available for every
possible form of human error. Some problems may never invite a
reasonable intervention; others may have to await the development
of some presently unknown or not yet imagined technology. We
will restrict the term "intervention strategy" to interventions
designed to prevent specific classes or types of human error, not
just to generally improve flight safety. Thus we would not call
purchasing a new simulator for pilot training an intervention
strategy for human error, although the resulting training might
be preventive.
In the two chapters that follow, we shall examine various
intervention strategies, and errors they were designed to
prevent, and comment on the effectiveness of these measures.
These chapters are separated with respect to traditional and
advanced technologies. In some areas, fairly specific human
errors will be discussed. In other areas, such as training, the
errors are more non-specific. For example, CRM training is aimed
at a constellation of behaviors related to crew coordination,
leadership, advocacy, and communication (Wiener, 1989b, pp. 119).
D. TWO MODELS OF INTERVENTION
Two models of intervention strategies are proposed. They differ
only in the degree of problem specificity that they are designed
to attack. In the first (Model A), the problem is well defined
and highly confined (e.g. the error of initiating a takeoff with
the control surfaces locked), and the intervention is specific
(Model A) . The sequence is P-I-R (Problem-Intervention-Result).
A specific solution is sought for a specific problem.
In Model B interventions, the problem is broad-scale (e.g.
distraction in the cockpit), or is a host of problems, and the
intervention is therefore non-specific. A good example is CRM
training. This is a broad-scale effort to intervene in a
broad-scale, less well defined problem (lack of leadership, poor
teamwork, lack of crew coordination). Each of these is not a
human error per se, but something that might lead to one (e.g.
poor cockpit coordination may result in mismatching altimeter
settings). The models are displayed graphically below.
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MODEL A
DIRECT INTERVENTION
SPECIFIC ERROR
PROBLEM
(ERROR)
iNTERVENTION
(MEASURE)
RESU
MODEL B
CONDITIONAL INTERVENTION
GENERAL CONDITIONS
PROBLEM
(CONDITION) ---,-b. ERROR ,-b.
INTERVENTION
STRATEGY
(MEASURE)
RESU_
Figure II-3. Two models of intervention.
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III. INTERVENTION STRATEGIES: TRADITIONAL TECHNOLOGIES
A. HARDWARE
In this section we shall consider a wide variety of intervention
strategies centering around traditional hardware. This is the
home court of human factors engineering. The distinction implied
by the word "traditional" is to set these interventions apart
from those involving advanced technologies found on modern
aircraft, and from potentially helpful computer technologies (AI)
not yet implemented in civil aircraft. We note that some
advanced technologies have been implemented in military aircraft,
and these may have potential for civil aviation. Military
operations will be the proving ground.
The definition of "traditional" as used here is somewhat
arbitrary. For our purposes, the term will mean such aircraft as
the B-727, DC-8 and DC-9, and older models of the B-737 and
A-300, not equipped with an advanced flight management computer
(FMC) such as that found in the glass cockpit aircraft
(B-747-400, B-757/767, A-310/320, and A-300-600, F-100, MD-88,
etc.). Aircraft such as RVAV-equipped MD-80s, DC-10s, B-747s and
L-1011s fall into the boundary land of cockpit automation. Some
carriers have equipped models of the L-1011 with an FMC similar
to that found in a glass cockpit, with similar capability in the
lateral navigation mode, but comparatively limited vertical
navigation capability. Also there are currently programs to
retrofit traditional cockpits (e.g. DC-8, C-130, B-727) with EFIS
instrumentation.
General Human Factors Enqineerinq
Here we aggregate under one heading a vast amount of information
and technique with a history of over 50 years. (For an early
book on the topic, see Chapanis, Garner, and Morgan, 1949.)
Human factors includes the design of controls, displays, codes,
and information, communication, and work place layout, just to
mention a few. Much of the early work aimed at preventing human
error is now disparagingly described by many as "knobs and
dials." The interesting thing about knobs and dials is that with
all of the sophistication of human factors today, and the
contributions toward preventing the types of errors of the past,
these errors never seem to completely vanish. The inadvertent
shutdown of both engines on a B-767 has been previously mentioned
(Preble, 1987). Another example is the shutdown of the wrong
engine following an auto-feather on takeoff of a two-engine Nord
262 at Los Angeles (NTSB, 1979). The following report
illustrates "knobs and dials" problems in fuel management.
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Narrative: one engine was burning more fuel than the other.
So we tried crossfeeding fuel to correct the imbalance. We
were distracted with other duties and inadvertently crossfed
too long, so we were not able to correct the fuel imbalance
as much as desired before landing. The indicator light for
crossfeed on this airplane is located in a position on the
cockpit panel that is down low and difficult to see. I
consider this a design defect. It should be placed at eye
level to make it easier for pilots to monitor the crossfeed
status. (ASRS No. 121913)
Keyboards, which are gaining increased prominence in cockpits due
to the growth of digital systems, are a rich source of human
error. As Wiener (1989a) pointed out, after five decades of
human factors research and application, keyboard layouts are
still not standardized: two or possibly three keyboards of
different design can be found in the same cockpit. The
vulnerability of aircraft to keyboard errors has been well
established (Wiener and Curry, 1980); they have been responsible
for some of our more dramatic accidents in recent years (Wiener,
1987a, 1988). Furthermore, data entry via keyboard into a
digital system creates the possibility of latent errors which may
lie dormant in the system for hours until they finally become
active. An example would be lateral navigation waypoints. A
discussion of latent errors can be found in Reason (1990).
Reason likens such phenomena in human-machine systems to the
biological concept of "resident pathogens" - pathological
conditions in living beings that may dwell harmlessly until they
mature or become triggered, resulting in serious illness.
The problems of crew interaction with keyboard data entry can be
seen in the following ASRS report.
Narrative: while preparing for departure, the captain loaded
incorrect position coordinates in the IRS pos. Instead of a
correct position of approximately N 50 deg 15 mins, E 00 deg
01 mins, he loaded N 50 deg 15 mins W 00 deg 01 mins.
Contributing factors. Rushing to beat a noise curfew; short
layover; lack of crew coordination and cross check. This
resulted in a NAV map shift of approximately 30 mi. The
problem was discovered on initial departure when radar told
us we weren't proceeding on the proper course. The problem
was discovered quickly and no conflict occurred. We switched
to manual nav. However, we couldn't continue our ocean
crossing and diverted to Shannon, Ireland, where we made an
overweight landing. Human performance considerations:
although the captain was supposed to be giving me a nav
check he rapidly and without asking for verification
programmed the computers himself. We had sufficient time to
do the job right but didn't take it. I should have cross
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checked our position, but didn't. (It isn't in our nay
checklist to do so). (ASRS No. 150785)
More will be said about the management of such errors in the
section on advanced technology. As more highly automated
aircraft join airline fleets, keyboards will probably play an
increasing role in incidents, accidents, and violations, at least
until a substitute for the traditional keyboard can be found.
Other devices, including thecomputer "mouse" are being examined.
Boeing plans to include a control employing the pilot's finger on
a pad as a pointing device in the B-777. The pointer would give
the pilot mouse-like control of the electronic checklist, the
electronic library system (when implemented), and some
navigational functions (Scott, 1991). However, the practicality
of the mouse as an input device has not yet been tested in line
operations. Even if successful, it would be premature to
forecast an early demise of the keyboard as the primary input
device to airborne computers. Keyboards are flexible, reliable,
inexpensive, familiar to the user. They are also highly
vulnerable to "finger error."
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Examples of interventions through design, as well as
design-induced errors, are endless (see Wiener, 1987b, and almost
any textbook on human factors). Cases where errors were induced
by advanced automatic systems can be found in Norman, 1983;
Wiener and Curry, 1980; and Wiener, 1988a.
Much of the improvement in aviation safety since the dawn of
human factors engineering during World War II can be attributed
to hardware interventions, which range from simple to complex."
The example of the mechanical throttle stop on the gust lock
control of the Convair has already been mentioned.
Self-illuminating fuel shutoff and engine fire extinguisher
handles guide the pilot to the correct handle to be pulled in the
event of an engine fire, one of the rare instances where the same
device is both control and display The (virtual) replacement of
the three-hand altimeter has eliminated the possibility of 10,000
foot errors, although the ideal, error-resistant altimeter face
has yet to be designed. The following case speaks to the
misinterpretation of the three-hand altimeter.
Narrative: the appropriate checklists were completed and we
took off for Akron, Ohio. We were handed off to Cleveland
Center and instructed to climb to 9000' MSL. I contacted
Cleveland Center and started out of 8300' MSL for 9000 MSL.
The controller said "Cleveland altimeter 29.86, say again
alt". At this time I stated Roger 29.86 and level 9000' MSL.
He said that he showed 10000 MSL. I said 29.86 and I show
9000' MSL exactly. At this time I glanced at my F/O's
altimeter and his said 10000' MSL. On closer inspection of
mine I saw the baro pressure set at 28.86 instead of 29.86.
The altimeter for some reason was set 1000' high. No
maintenance was performed on it and neither me nor my F/O
caught it. My F/O also missed his required call of 8000' for
9000' Had he did this the problem may not have occurred. We
have old style 3-hand altimeters installed in the
airplanes. Usually setting the instrument on the ground I
check the 100' hand for field elevation. I now must also
include the I000' hand. In the checklist we set the
altimeter, say the numbers and cross check each other's.
Even this operation didn't catch the discrepancy. (ASRS No.
61621)
Regrettably, many of the interventions in hardware design have
been implemented after-the-fact, in response to some accident.
But happily designers have developed a well-honed awareness
concerning error-resistant design, and thus, with each advancing
decade, cockpits have increasingly reflected the experiences of
the past, and the growing sophistication of human factors
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engineering (see Sexton, 1988).
What is more regrettable is that error analysis is not a
certification requirement. Under Part 25 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations (FARs), the only place where a systematic human
factors analysis is required is in the area of workload. And
this is for the limited purpose of determining whether the
workload is excessive for the proposed crew size. Aircraft
designers have developed a high degree of sophistication in
applying failure analyses techniques (e.g. failure mode and
effects analysis -- FMEA) to proposed designs for aircraft
structures and components (Miller, 1988). What is obviously
needed is the development of similar techniques for evaluating
designs for their human error potential, perhaps in the manner
that Swain and Guttman (1983) have done in the nuclear industry.
From such analyses, interventions could flow before the cockpit
design is hardened. One major manufacturer appointed "what if"
teams in order to detect potential problems.
GUIDELINE NO. 9
The intervention strategy should be economically feasible
and otherwise acceptable to management (e.g. minimize
contractual implications). It should likewise not impose a
cost elsewhere in the overall system (see also No. 7)
Simplification versus Automation
In the last two decades, with the rapid growth in microprocessor
technology, there has been a temptation on the part of some
designers to build very complex systems based on the rationale
that they could operate automatically. There are two fallacies
in this argument. First, almost no major system on an aircraft
truly operates fully automatically: the systems must be
initialized or set up by the human, decisions about operating
modes must be made, and then the systems must be monitored by the
humans for obvious reasons. Second, in the event of the failure
of automation, it falls to the human to operate the system. This
responsibility cannot be avoided or designed away. If the
complexity of the systems is unbridled, then the crew may not be
able to perform their duties effectively, nor take over in the
event of equipment failure.
In response, many design engineers with human factors
sophistication have recognized that simplification offers an
alternative to automation. If the system can be simplified,
there may be no need for complex automation, and the same goal
can be achieved without placing the human into a potentially
hazardous position. An example is the fuel system on a
multi-engine aircraft. Those favoring automation would find no
problem with creating a complex tank-to-tank and tank-to-engine
33
relationship, as long as its management could be automated. If,
for example, a fuel imbalance were created, automatic devices
would detect this, determine a remedy, open the required transfer
valves and turn on the appropriate pumps to restore the proper
balance. No human intervention would be required.
This example represents a philosophical difference between two
major aircraft manufacturers. The Douglas approach, as
exemplified by the MD-II, has been to remove the pilot from the
loop and turn certain functions over to sophisticated automation
(Scott, 1992). Compensation is automatic - the systems do not
ask the crew's approval. Boeing's approach is to never bypass
the crew: sophisticated devices will inform the crew of a need,
and in some cases a step-by-step procedure, but in the end it is
the crew that must authorize and conduct the procedure (O'Lone,
1992). Boeing is a strong advocate of simplification before
automation. Their designers would look to a less complex
relationship. An example would be fewer tanks to feed the
engines, creating fewer tank-to-tank and tank-to-engine
requirements, requiring less management by the crew, and fewer
opportunities for human error (Fadden and Weener, 1984; Aviation
Week and Space Technoloqy [AWST], 1988). The report below serves
as an example of fuel management difficulties.
Narrative: fuel crossfeed inadvertently left on after the
preflight inspection during a crew change. A fuel imbalance
resulted (approximately 3000 pounds) during the short flight
from LAX to LAS, which was 37 minutes. The imbalance was
first noticed when I disconnected the autopilot during
descent for the approach. The captain and I were surprised
that so much fuel could feed from the left side when
pressure on both left and right should be equal. Given the
high tank loading on such a short flight, perhaps some sort
of warning light is appropriate to warn the pilots when an
imbalance is occurring. No such light presently exists on
the aircraft. Every military aircraft I've flown has fuel
imbalance caution lights. Why not on civilian aircraft where
the effects on weight and balance are more critical? (ASRS
No. 115002)
The potential difficulty with over-automation of systems is that
the crew simply cannot be aware of the state of the system at all
times. Norman (1990) discussed the hazards of automatic devices
silently remedying a situation about which the crew was unaware.
The difficulty lies in the lack of awareness on the part of the
crew that an abnormal condition exists, if the on-board computers
are compensating without informing the crew. Efficient automatic
compensation for abnormal events and conditions sounds
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attractive, but there is always a limit to the machine's capacity
to compensate. When that limit is reached, something drastic may
happen, as in the well-known case of the Air China 747 (NTSB,
1986; Wiener, 1988a). The crew may have no awareness of either
the problem or the compensation until the automation reaches the
limits of its authority.
As Norman stressed, the problem in highly automated devices is
not automation per se, but the lack of feedback. A design
principle is apparent here: simplify any system to the extent
possible; then and only then turn to automation if it is still
needed. When automation is compensating for some worsening
condition, the crew must be informed.
Hardware Standardization
In this section we shall consider the standardization of cockpit
hardware, both within models and fleets of derivative models, and
across fleets. For a similar discussion regarding flight-deck
procedures, see Degani and Wiener (in preparation).
Standardization with respect to procedures, documentation, and
training will be revisited in the section below on procedures.
[For a clarification of the two meanings of the term "fleet", see
Note No. 3, Chapter VII].
GUIDELINE NO. 10
Wherever possible, the intervention strategy should be
common to all models within a fleet and across fleets within
the same company. When an intervention is recommended or
specified by the manufacturer, or imposed by agencies
outside of a company (e.g. manufacturer, government) it
should be common to all operators of the equipment, wherever
possible.
Between fleets. Between-fleet standardization of hardware
is considered desirable in order to reduce training and
maintenance costs, as well as to prevent human error that may
occur as a result of the pilots moving from one aircraft to
another. During periods of rapid expansion of aircraft
inventories and pilot personnel, as the airline industry in the
U.S. and elsewhere enjoyed in the late 1980's, there is frequent
movement between aircraft as pilots bid for more lucrative
assignments, more modern aircraft, or desirable bases. Some
contracts limit the rapidity with which pilots may bid a new
seat, others do not.
Most cockpit hardware is peculiar to the type of aircraft.
However, certain cockpit hardware could be common to most or all
models operated by a carrier, for example radios, flight
directors, certain displays, area navigation equipment, weather
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radar, etc. Other examples would be devices added after the
original manufacture (e.g. TCAS, ACARS). Where the carrier has
the opportunity to purchase these add-on units, a common model
will most likely be chosen, for all of the reasons stated above.
Where differences already exist between fleets, the airline may
intervene by standardizing throughout the airline. For example,
some airlines have invested in a common airline-wide model of the
flight director.
Between-fleet standardization, if it involves retrofit rather
than new equipment purchase, will be extremely costly, and its
safety benefits may be modest compared to within-fleet
standardization. Nonetheless, when pilots move rapidly through
the seats of various aircraft, or complete training for one
aircraft and then return to another while awaiting assignment to
the new aircraft, between-fleet standardization of cockpit
hardware deserves inclusion in the list of intervention
strategies.
Within fleets. Far more critical is within-fleet
standardization. Long before the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, carriers purchased aircraft from each other, thus
generating mixed configurations within fleets. With the coming
of deregulation, the pace of mergers and acquisitions, as well as
used equipment purchases and leases, accelerated rapidly This
produced fleets of traditional aircraft, such as B-727s, 737s,
and DC-9s, that varied greatly with respect to cockpit
configuration. These differences included different displays
(e.g. various models of flight directors), warning and alerting
systems (e.g. a host of altitude warning systems with various
trigger points), every imaginable engine configuration, controls
in different locations, various directions of movement of
switches, and various operating limitations. One carrier, which
had been through a number of mergers and acquisitions of other
DC-9 operators, had eight different models or locations of
altitude alerters. They later invested a very considerable sum
in order to standardize the cockpits of their DC-9 fleet. Within
fleet standardization is considered a high priority item by the
line pilots and their safety committees.
In one rather strange example, a carrier with a large DC-9 fleet
had seven DC-9-10 aircraft which it had purchased from another
carrier. These aircraft had a 215-knot speed restriction for
gear-down flight due to a modified gear door. For the rest of
the fleet, it was 270 knots. These were known as the "215
aircraft." Various informal "placards" appeared to remind the
pilot that he/she was flying a 215 model. In one aircraft in
which the author jumpseated, someone had written on the
instrument panel, in inch-high letters, "CCXV".
The most extreme case of non-standardization within a fleet that
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the author has seen was brought to his attention by ALPA when a
U.S. carrier considered buying a small number of DC-9s from a
European carrier. The European DC-9s had the slow-fast and the
glide slope deviation indicators reversed with respect to their
position on the ADI compared to the rest of the purchaser's
fleet. The pilots' union took an understandably strong stand
against flying the "mixed" instrumentation.
We have already acknowledged that within-fleet standardization of
cockpit hardware is an extremely costly. But failure to do so
leaves standing in the cockpit a host of potential trip wires for
human error, not to mention the increased cost of training,
maintenance, and documentation. In addition to the other
benefits of common hardware configurations in a given fleet is
the fact that only through standardization can the company's
simulator(s) faithfully represent every aircraft in the fleet.
It is distracting for an instructor to have to remind students
that the simulator is different from various models in the fleet.
It is easy for one to forget that the purpose of a simulator is
to simulate.
Narrative: during climb out the indicated airspeed regis-
tered in excess of 250 kts by about 2000' below 10000' MSL.
The captain occupying the left seat was new to the aircraft,
the EWRdeparture area and this was his first trip in this
type aircraft. Additionally, the autoplt was giving very
slow responses to pitch commands which in my opinion was the
primary reason for the excess airspd. The IOE check captain
in the right seat was aware of the high spd but was letting
the PF work through the prob. To prevent a recurrence, the
PF should disconnect the autoplt and hand fly the aircraft
until such time spd and altitude are not as critical as they
are below i0000'. Also the IOE instructor might have been
more vocal in bringing the high airspd to the PF's
attention. Supplemental info from ASRS No. 145130. We had
been flying Type X on every leg of this IOE training flight.
My first exposure was this morning, May, 1980. We were then
clred up to 17000' When I engaged the nose up pos, the
pitch change went from level to about a +300 fpm clb,
probably. I say probably, because when I engaged the HDG
select switch, or rather what I thought was the HDG select,
I engaged ALT HLD which is in the exact location on this
aircraft as the HDG select switch is on the Type X on which
I had been turning. The next thing I hear is my IOE captain
very gently saying, "airspd, airspd." Supplemental info from
ASRS No. 145128. South of COYLE VOR, PF (IOE student)
drifted off course slightly. I pointed out from our computer
flight plan that the winds were a I00 kt direct xwind.
Student corrected even greater than his 25 deg correction
and we reintercepted course. Conducting IOE in a different
model aircraft in the very very demanding NYC area is quite
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a challenge. There sometimes is a very fine line between
letting a student push a limit and learn and taking the
aircraft away. Should I have taken the aircraft? (ASRS No.
145243)
Warninq and Alertinq Systems
Warning and alerting systems are a middle level line of defense
against human error. They may anticipate the possible error or
condition (e.g. ,,insufficient fuel" message in a glass cockpit
aircraft). They may warn the crew of an impending hazard (e.g.
GPWS), or annunciate the error as it occurs (e.g. mis-
configuration takeoff warnings). In many cases they may be
considered backups to human vigilance (e.g. out of balance fuel
conditions) where the operator has the necessary information
available before the system reaches the alarm condition. In
other cases warning and alerting systems are not, in the
strictest sense, interventions against human error, but are
extensions of human sensory capability (e.g. engine fire
warnings, baggage compartment doors not closed). These examples
represent not a lack of human vigilance, but sensory limitations.
Some systems are mixed - human capabilities may or may not be
sufficient for detecting the alert condition (e.g. a potential
conflict with another aircraft as annunciated by TCAS).
We shall not review in any detail the human factors of warning
and alerting systems, as there are many recognized treatises on
this subjects (Veitengruber, Baucek, and Smith, 1977; Randle,
Larsen, and Williams, 1980), but shall merely place the topic in
its proper context as an intervention strategy.
First we suggest that any new warning system should be held up
against the applicable guidelines in Appendix i. It should be
required to meet the criteria of economy, feasibility, effective
human engineering, acceptance, etc. The proliferation of warning
systems in the cockpit has been well documented (Wiener and
Curry, 1980), and the trend is difficult to reverse. The design
of the B-767/757 was a great step forward in simplifying and
unifying the warning systems in the cockpit (Morton, 1982). More
will be said later of the potential for warning systems in high
technology aircraft.
No warning and alerting system is perfect. None can provide an
absolute guarantee against the human error it was designed to
prevent, as the crash of Northwest 255 illustrated (NTSB, 1988).
The lamentable history of gear-up landings is testimonial to
this. A gear-up landing may seem a simple error to prevent,
compared to a far more complex error such as a wrong-airport
landing, for which no hardware/documentation intervention is
obvious. Indeed, we have probably run out of intervention
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strategies to prevent gear-up landings.
to highly experienced pilots. They still occur, even
The imperfection of warning devices is attributable to a variety
of problems, from failure of human vigilance to internal failures
of the device itself. To begin with, any alerting device is
subject to both Type I (commissive) and Type II (omissive)
errors. The designer attempts to balance these two types of
inevitable error. Deliberate disarming of the device, or
deliberate ignoring of the warning are more common than we would
wish. In two no-slat/flap takeoffs mentioned previously, the
configuration warnings did not trigger. In one case (B-727) it
was probably due to a simple mechanical failure (NTSB, 1989); in
the other (MD-82), no electrical power was available to the
system, for reasons unknown (NTSB, 1988).
Another weakness in crew-warning interaction is what Wiener and
Curry (1980) termed "primary-backup inversion." This term
reflects the fact that it is not unusual for crews to allow the
alarm condition to alert them before they take action. In brief,
the primary system (human vigilance) becomes the backup system
and the backup system (alerting device) becomes primary. The
lines of defense depicted in Figure II-i are reversed, and human
vigilance alone is an insufficient defense. An example of
primary-backup inversion can be found in the common practice of
an altitude callout i000 feet prior to reaching target altitude.
It is not at all unusual to see the responsible crew member
(usually the pilot not flying [PNF]) allow the altitude alerter
to sound, and then make his callout (Wiener, 1987c). This
practice relaxes a line of defense against altitude deviation.
It is especially insidious since there are a great variety of
possible trigger points for various models of the altitude
alerter. Unfortunately the practice described is very common.
We can end this discussion by simply noting that the human is not
a backup system, and should not be used as such. The human
remains a vital component in complex systems found in aviation
and elsewhere because he/she possesses remarkable perceptual
capabilities, among them the ability to detect subtle deviations
from normal. This capability should be assigned to the front end
of the lines of defense against human error. Human error is the
price we pay for the flexibility of the human brain. It is a
price that must be minimized by effective intervention strategies
and lines of defense.
Error Detection and Error Recovery
Systems designers recognize that human errors cannot always be
prevented. Therefore they must construct the system to be
impervious to error to the degree possible. Since there are more
elaborate opportunities for doing this in advanced technology
aircraft, we shall hold the discussion of this approach until the
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next chapter. However, in the traditional technology cockpits,
error detection and error recovery are important topics. The
first principle is that if an error is entered into a system, the
design should allow the error to be recognized by the crew as
quickly as possible. This is what Wiener (1989a) has called an
"error evident" design. In brief, errors should be made
conspicuous to the operator.
The recovery principle states that when error occurs, and is
detected by the crew, a simple recovery should be available. No
action should be irreversible, and the crew should not have to
accept the adverse consequences of any error, once they have
discovered it. To use a familiar non-aviation example, should I
make an error and erase text or a file while using my word
processor, I have readily available an "unerase" recovery
technique, as part of the software. The system does not prevent
the error, but it can nullify its consequences. In this case it
can render the error totally inconsequential. We should ask as
much of the designers of more complex human-machine systems.
Without the file and text recovery software, such an error would
be unrecoverable and disastrous (in the eyes of the author).
To be sure, some errors are irreversible, particularly those
where resources are expended and cannot be recovered (e.g. fuel
dumping, triggering engine fire extinguishing agents, etc.)
Those cases call for particular care in the design of equipment,
procedures, supporting documents, and training protocols.
B. PROCEDURESAND SUPPORTINGDOCUMENTATION
Intervention via hardware design and retrofit has long been the
concern of the human factors profession; intervention via
procedures and documentation has usually been somebody else's
problem. The somebody is generally the management of the
organization using the equipment. The classic view of human
factors has been to design the hardware right in the first place,
and everything else will take care of itself. But recent
dramatic accidents have shown the inadequacy of this view.
Serious questions have been raised about such "soft" areas as
checklist behavior, computer-produced flight plans and other
flight-deck paperwork, procedures and policies, and flight-deck
communication protocol. By the late 1980s, cockpit resource
management had become a "household term" in commercial and later
in military transports (Wiener, Kanki, and Helmreich, 1993).
Spurred by the advent of the glass cockpit aircraft, several
airline managements struggled with the task of developing a
philosophy of automation. Experience in the training departments
as well as on the line had convinced management pilots that a
guiding statement of philosophy was not a bad idea. The
statement developed by Delta was, to the author's knowledge, the
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first in the industry (see below). The efforts of management to
develop this policy are detailed in Byrnes and Black (1993).
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
TABLE III-l. Delta Air Lines Automation Philosophy Statement
The word "Automation", where it appears in this statement,
shall mean the replacement of human function, either manual
or cognitive, with a machine function. This definition
applies to all levels of automation in all airplanes flown
by this airline. The purpose of automation is to aid the
pilot is doing his or her job.
The pilot is the most complex, capable and flexible
component of the air transport system, and as such is best
suited to determine the optimal use of resources in any
given situation.
Pilots must be proficient in operating their airplanes in
all levels of automation. They must be knowledgeable in the
selection of the appropriate degree of automation, and must
have the skills needed to move from one level of automation
to another.
Automation should be used at the level most appropriate to
enhance the priorities of Safety, Passenger Comfort, Public
Relations, Schedule, and Economy, as stated in the Flight
Operations Policy Manual.
In order to achieve the above priorities, all Delta Air
Lines training programs, training devices, procedures,
checklists, aircraft and equipment acquisitions, manuals,
quality control programs, standardization, supporting
documents, and the day-to-day operations of Delta aircraft
shall be in accordance with this statement of philosophy.
(Reprinted from Wiener, Chidester, Kanki, Palmer, Curry, and
Gregorich, 1991)
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Degani and Wiener sought to examine the softer areas, first
concentrating on checklists (1990), later on what we called "The
Three P's" - philosophy, policies, and procedures (1991). We
pointed out the vulnerability of aircraft (as well as other
high-risk systems) to lapses in checklists and the conduct of
procedures, and offered guidelines for their design and
41
implementation. We later decided that it was necessary to add a
fourth 'P' this one being practices, that is, what actually8
occurs in flight. The difference between procedures and
practices is procedural deviation, or error, which is the focus
of an expanded report (Degani and Wiener, in preparation). In
the next section we shall briefly examine the opportunities for
intervention into the soft areas.
Standardization
The importance of hardware standardization was discussed
previously. The same principles apply to supporting
documentation. Degani and Wiener (1990) discuss the importance of
standardization in checklist design and nomenclature. At many
carriers there are great differences in the design of checklists
across fleets, differences that cannot be explained by the
obvious fact that they exist for different aircraft.
Within an organization we found little evidence of unifying
principles of checklist design and conduct. Checklists were
obviously designed and implemented by various groups at various
times, and were thought to be optimal for that aircraft. As to
nomenclature, the same piece of hardware had different names in
the different fleets (e.g., thrust levers, power levers, and
throttles). Just how serious this problem may be is difficult to
assess. Some airlines have attempted to standardize hardware
nomenclature. We visited a major carrier and were told that they
had attempted to standardize nomenclature across fleets and had
found it surprisingly difficult. They abandoned the project.
Standardization should not be an end in itself. Standardization
exists to establish both in fact and in outlook that the company
has arrived on a "best way" to do things, and that this best way
may transcend even fleets of very different aircraft. Degani and
Wiener (1991) refer to standardization as "the palace guard of
procedures." One of the virtues of standardization is that each
pilot should know exactly what to expect of another pilot.
Standardization also serves as an intervention against human
error. Procedures, checklists, and paperwork are established and
crews are trained in one consistent, predictable way, in keeping
with the company's basic operating philosophy. In theory,
transition from one model to another should not be difficult.
Although the systems are different, the basic operating methods
of various aircraft share much in common.
Standardization of supporting documentation is not cost free.
The costs flow from the fact that in order to achieve
company-wide uniformity, some equipment may be operated
sub-optimally. Degani and Wiener (1990) provide the following
example. An operator in the early days of the MD-80 allowed
crews to fly mixed lines of DC-9 and MD-80 time. The MD-80's
weather radar operated with much lower power than that found in
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the older sets in the DC-9s, and unlike the DC-9 radars, could be
turned on at the gate with no hazard to ground personnel.
Fearing that crews flying mixed lines might inadvertently operate
the DC-9 radars as if they were MD-80 sets, management decided to
intervene by standardizing on the safe side. Checklists for the
MD-80 were rewritten to adopt the more conservative DC-9 radar
procedures. This may have resulted in somewhat sub-optimal
procedures for the MD-80s, but the added protection against human
error, with its potential endangerment of ground personnel, was
considered worth the price. This was a classic example of
employing standard operating procedures as an intervention to
control errors.
Procedure Desiqn
Procedures are step-by-step specifications drafted by management
and provided to pilots. They are designed to dictate the manner
in which tasks and sub-tasks are carried out and to provide a
standardization of cockpit duties. In a well standardized and
procedurized operation, one of the pilots could be removed from
his/her seat in mid-flight and replaced by another, and crew
performance would not suffer. Procedures have often been
confused with checklists. Degani and Wiener (1991, p. 2) explain
the difference: "A checklist is a device (paper, mechanical,
audio, or electronic format) that exists to ensure that
procedures are carried out. The confusion may come from the fact
that 'running' a checklist is in itself a procedure."
Procedures and subtasks are considered here because they are the
most elemental steps by which pilots operate their craft.
Procedures are fertile ground for human error, and, thus, for
intervention strategies. When new equipment is installed, new
procedures are needed and checklists must be revised. A recent
example is the installation of the first TCAS equipment into the
cockpits of airliners in 1990, which necessitated training
programs, documentation, procedures, and checklist revisions. It
is too early to know how successful these procedures and
checklists have been in exploiting the safety potential of TCAS,
and avoiding errors in its use. So far the reports on TCAS have
generally been favorable, even with the problems that usually
accompany the introduction of new systems (Gilmartin, 1991;
Smith, 1991; NTSB, 1993).
An interesting example of procedural intervention would be the
loading of coordinates for waypoints in area navigation systems.
We shall consider here the traditional RNAV equipment, in which
each waypoint is defined by a pair of coordinates ("lat and
lon"). More modern avionic equipment, utilizing waypoints stored
by name in a flight management computer (FMC), will be considered
shortly.
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The vulnerability of such systems to various human errors,
primarily, though not exclusively, those induced by keyboard
input error, has been documented by Aarons (1988), Wiener(1988a), and Wiener and Curry (1980). Some of the most dramatic
accidents of the last decade can be attributed to RNAV input
errors. In brief, it is the task of the crew to take a paper
flight plan and establish the waypoints by loading the latitude
and longitude for each via keyboard. This task is a breeding
ground for error. Errors in this procedure are so common that-
they have their own nickname: "finger trouble" or "finger
error. "
Operators have sought to control the errors by intervening
procedurally in various ways, for example by establishing
redundant input of the same information by the two or three crew
members, and by establishing checking procedures once the
coordinates are loaded. The procedures vary considerably from
one company to another. Specific techniques for cross-checking
are covered in FAA Advisory Circular No. 90-79, 7/14/80,
"Recommended practices and procedures for the use of electronic
long-range navigation equipment." Some companies require that
each of the two or three crew members load the data independently
from his/her own copy of the flight plan. The system then
detects discrepancies. Others specify that one pilot load the
data and another check it against the flight plan. Some carriers
emphasize error detection by cross-checking against other data on
the flight plan, for example, distances between waypoints. The
RNAV computer calculates the distance between the waypoints as
loaded: the crew checks these against their flight plan. A
coordinate error would result in a discrepancy between the paper
flight plan and the RNAV readout with respect to
waypoint-to-waypoint distances. These checks are particularly
important in trans-oceanic operations.
In spite of a variety of intervention strategies, it is still
possible to insert erroneous data: a single keystroke can result
in an incorrectly located waypoint. In over-water operations
some of the lines of defense in Table II-i are absent. Further,
an incorrect waypoint may reside dormant in the RNAV computer for
hours, until its time comes to be activated. In one dramatic
example, two U.S. wide body jets passed within 30 feet of each
other over the North Atlantic in Canadian airspace (Canadian
Aviation Safety Board, 1989).
We do not know of any "one best way" to prevent keyboard errors.
Hopefully new technologies will soon make RNAV data loading less
critical. Satellite navigation and communication will prevent
any aircraft from being outside the communication range of ATC,
and will provide a "virtual radar" coverage for aircraft wherever
they may be, thus restoring vital lines of defense found in
overland operations.
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Lateral navigation (LNAV) systems found in FMC-equipped aircraft
provide more error-free input procedures, and map displays found
in the EFIS-equipped aircraft provide error-evident displays that
can make a waypoint error obvious to the crew. More will be said
about this in the next chapter.
Checklist Desiqn and Usaqe
The complex issue of the human factors of checklist design,
implementation, and usage/non-usage has been explored in detail
by Degani and Wiener (1990). Our report included sixteen
guidelines for checklist design and use (see Appendix 3 of this
document). Basic questions involve what should and should not be
included on the checklist; in what order items should appear;
whether any items be repeated for redundancy; how items should be
subdivided ("chunked") on the checklist; "do it" versus
"verification" checklists; and many more. The checklist is far
more than a "laundry list" of items and tasks. The checklist
serves to prevent error by stating what must be done, when and in
what order, and by whom it is done. It also provides the basis
for and sets the tone for cockpit discipline and standardization.
This document, often a single piece of paper, is the very
foundation of flight safety. Procedures, in turn, dictate to the
crew ho___wwthe tasks are done (Degani and Wiener, in preparation).
A distinction must be made between checklist desiqn (what
actually goes on the checklist, and how it is displayed) and the
"how" of checklist behavior - who does what (e.g. challenge and
response), what must be done when a checklist is interrupted, who
calls for the checklist, how each sub-task is terminated. Degani
and Wiener (1990) explain the difference between a "do" list and
a "confirmation" (or "verification") list.
Following three accidents in the U.S. in which airliners took off
without flaps and slats set, checklist design became a prominent
issue. I was asked during my testimony at the NTSB hearing on
the Northwest MD-82 accident what human factors work had been
done on checklist design. I had to admit that I had been unable
to find any except for some studies of typography and printing
layout which would be of minor importance except in the extreme
(Wiener, 1987c). The Board's question was the genesis of the
Degani and Wiener checklist studies.
Electronic checklists may replace paper versions in future
aircraft. Boeing has included such a device in its 777 (Scott,
1991). Electronic checklists have many advantages over
conventional versions, particularly when the checklist must be
interrupted or items must be taken out of order. The electronic
checklist will handle this very well; in the paper checklist,
interrupting the process is an invitation to error. However, a
recent NASA simulator study of electronic versus standard
checklists found that the standard checklists yielded superior
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performance (Palmer and Degani, 1991). These results may be due
to an interface problem in this particular implementation;
research on electronic checklists is presently underway at
several locations.
For many years to come, the primary intervention strategy against
human error in the cockpit will be a conventional paper
checklist. It is somewhat ironic that the safety of a modern
aircraft worth tens of millions of dollars still depends to a °
great degree on a device that can be reproduced for pennies.
Methods Improvement
We will next discuss a wide variety of actions that can be
viewed, in the industrial engineering sense, as methods
improvement. This form of intervention includes actions which
simplify paperwork and procedures, reduce the number of steps in
a procedure, relocate the steps in a logical manner ("flow"), and
generally reduce or manage workload.
In these cases the P-I-R (problem-intervention-result)
relationship which was discussed in the last chapter can be
fairly direct, or it can be indirect. Examples of each will be
offered; both Model A and Model B interventions apply. Where the
P-I-R relationship is indirect or vaguely defined (Model B), it
is because the interventions may not be necessarily in response
to a particular problem, but a general problem. Usually the need
is to "clean up" an area, to simplify procedures, and to reduce
or better manage workload, wherever possible. This is based on
the assumption that reducing workload, particularly during
periods of high workload, will reduce human error.
The management of low workload periods of flight (e.g. cruise),
possibly by introduction of workload, either genuine or "make
work", may also be considered, but it should be viewed as an
entirely different problem. Interventions of this type are being
examined (Graeber, 1989), due in part to the use of two-pilot
crews on increasingly long legs. So far research into this area
has not matured to the point where intervention strategies can be
recommended. For now, we will confine our consideration of
workload management to _ levels of workload.
GUIDELINE NO. Ii
Examine each proposed intervention and ask if there is an
easier, less invasive, or less costly way to accomplish the
same thing.
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Paperwork enqineerinq. One area that is ubiquitous in
methods improvement is paperwork reduction and management.
Paperwork of any kind is onerous in the cockpit. As elsewhere,
it is subject to steady inflation. We should distinguish between
two types of paperwork, that which is necessary for any
particular flight (flight plans, NOTAMS, weather, weight and
balance advisories, fuel slips, maintenance writeups, etc.), and
that which is administrative (e.g. crew pay logs, engine
performance logs, and discrepancy reports).
Intervention strategies may consist of reducing cockpit workload
by eliminating or simplifying the paperwork not needed for
flight, or by assigning it to other personnel in cabin or on the
ground. The impact on the workload of these personnel should
not be ignored (see Chute and Wiener, in preparation), but it
will not be considered here, as the focus on this report is on
errors in the cockpit. However, we are not insensitive to the
impact, perhaps even safety impact, on the extra-cockpit
personnel to whom we are recommending that paperwork be diverted
(see Guideline No. 4, Appendix I).
A related area ripe for methods improvement is the design of the
paperwork for compatibility in the cockpit. Paperwork design has
not been an attractive area of human factors research and
application, even though it can be vitally important. In our
report on procedures (Degani and Wiener, 1991), we discuss
briefly the incompatibility of paperwork and "computerwork"
Much of the paperwork and procedures in use today by airlines
were designed for traditional aircraft, and have not been adapted
to the advanced technology cockpits.
Illustrative of this is an example from Wiener (1989b) in which
the crew of a B-757 was given a flight plan from Miami (MIA) to
Washington National (DCA) which included (in part) the following
routing: "radar vectors, AR-I CLB ILM J-40 RIC..." [Atlantic
Route 1 to Carolina Beach, direct Wilmington, jet airway 40 to
Richmond...] The crew attempted to enter the information on the
Route page of the CDU but could progress no further than "CLB".
Every time they typed CLB they received a "not in database" error
message in the scratch pad of the CDU. Repeated entries yielded
the same results. Finally one of the pilots traced the route on
his high altitude chart and discovered the problem: CLB is not a
VOR as the three-letter designator on the flight plan implied,
but is a non-directional beacon (NDB). The entry demanded by the
CDU to access this waypoint is "CLBNB".
This flight plan had been stored in the ground computer, and was
appropriate for all other types of aircraft in the airline's
fleet. This example in itself might not have been a serious
matter, but it did frustrate the crew and increase workload.
What is more important, it may have pointed toward other
examples, perhaps more serious, of paperwork-computerwork
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incompatibility. The intervention strategy is obvious: carriers
operating high technology aircraft should examine every aspect of
their operations and paperwork for incompatibility with the new
aircraft. It is no small task.
Other methods improvements could be achieved by paperwork
simplification and engineering. The author was told recently by
a captain that he had made a written request to his company that
the stations on a weather sequence printout be in alphabetical"
order, so he would not have to search for a station, particularly
when a diversion might be required. The company's response was
one with which we are all familiar: "That's how it comes out of
the computer". It is difficult to believe that it would not be a
fairly simple matter to build an alphabetical sort into the
weather sequence software, thereby reducing cockpit workload,
albeit by some small degree.
More serious examples can be found which justify our
recommendations that methods improvement be applied to the
routine production and handling of flight paperwork. Recently an
aircraft prepared to depart Miami and the crew was handed the
flight papers. As they loaded the information from the papers
into the CDU, an alert crew noticed that some of the numbers did
not conform with what they believed to be true, although most of
the information seemed logical and correct. Closer examination
revealed that they had been provided with the paperwork for the
identical flight from the previous day. Of course one may argue
that the crew should examine the date on first accepting their
flight papers. But one may state with equal verity that this was
a "trip wire" incident; no crew expects to be handed yesterday's
paperwork. The intervention strategy to ensure that this
particular error never occurs again may be more complex than it
first appears. The ASRS reports below illustrate that this was
not an isolated case.
Narrative: aircraft number and flight number reversed on
dispatch release. Computer then thought aircraft was a new
type, instead of the old type. New aircraft burn substan-
tially less fuel at cruise (1294 pounds difference for this
leg). During cruise flight we checked fuel against
computerized flight plan. Estimated arriving with less than
standard fuel (but close to "legal fuel"). After consulting
with dispatch it was decided to make a precautionary fuel
stop in LAS. Flight was from PDX to PHX. Crew needed to
double check release. The correct numbers were there, just
in the wrong order. Flight numbers will be rearranged so as
not to be same as aircraft number. Don't forget to compute
own estimate of fuel needed. I always did before I had
computerized flight plans. (ASRS No. 62844)
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The intervention appropriate for this problem seems obvious. The
author checked the flight schedules of one airline, and found
that it had no flight number 727, 737, 757, or 767 (all of which
aircraft it operates), though it did have flights with the
surrounding numbers (e.g. 726, 728). There is also no flight 747
in the schedule, even though they do not operate this aircraft.
The carrier does have a flight I011, which is a DC-9 trip.
Presumably these would not be likely candidates for confusion.
Narrative: we received final weight and balance just prior
to pushback from gate at Orlando. While taxiing to RWY 18R,
we received three more weight and balance sheets via
aircraft ACARS printer, the last of which varied consider-
ably from correct passenger count. Closer scrutiny and
questioning by the captain revealed this computer weight and
balance was for the same aircraft, but for a flight
originating in Boston. This type of scenario could easily
result in use of improper V-speeds and stabilizer trim
settings. (ASRS No. 162106)
GUIDELINE NO. 12
Examine all paperwork associated with an intervention
strategy, or that is in itself the intervention. Does this
paperwork actually aid the crew, or does it place
unnecessary burdens on the crew? Can the responsibility be
assigned elsewhere? If additional paperwork must be
implemented, can its form be made more pilot-friendly? Can
its design be improved?
Workload manaqement. There are ample opportunities for
intervention by manaqinq (as contrasted with reduction) of
workload. If workload cannot be eliminated or reduced, it can be
managed. Management consists of reallocating workload to less
flight-critical phases (e.g. programming that can be done at the
gate, rather than after takeoff); and reallocating duties
(particularly in a three-pilot crew) to balance the demands on
the individual crew members. For example, it has frequently been
suggested that installing a transmitter-receiver or an ACARS in
the cabin, for passenger-related communication by the flight
attendants, could reduce the radio communication load in the
cockpit. This suggestion has been resisted by some pilots, who
hold a traditional view that all transmissions from a craft
should emanate from the flight deck. (We note the prevalence of
cellular telephones in the hands of passengers today). Other
pilots see the transfer of passenger-related communication duties
to the cabin crew as good riddance.
In some cases the captain may manage workload by simply
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allocating duties and setting priorities on these duties. For
example, captains frequently say (in so many words), "Let's put
that off until later, and settle this problem first." The advent
of CRM training in recent years has encouraged such interventions
by the captain, as well as advocacy by the junior officer(s).
Advocacy of workload management by subordinates is often couched
as a question: e.g. "What would you think about my building the
approach before I call the company about the wheelchairs?"
GUIDELINE NO. 13
An intervention strategy should be acceptable to pilots or
other affected personnel. Those who design interventions
should recognize that frequently changes in flight-deck
regulations and procedures may encounter initial resistance
on the part of many. This can often be avoided, or
ameliorated, by seeking input from those affected, and
making the reason for the intervention and the potential
benefits clear to those affected (e.g. the sterile cockpit
rule).
C. COMMUNICATION
Linquistic and Para-Linquistic Communication
Aviation is highly dependent on human-to-human voice
communication (Kanki and Palmer, 1993). This is also a leading
source of error in the system, and one that is difficult to
combat. The problems of and opportunities for linguistic
intervention were mentioned earlier in this report. Numerous
investigators have explored this area both experimentally and by
examining incident and accident reports and self-reporting
systems. For example, Billings and Cheaney (1981), using the
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database, explored
the general area of errors in information transfer. Monan (1988)
employed ASRS reports to examine what has been called the
"hearback" problem, the frequent failure of pilots or controllers
to detect errors in a message when it is repeated back to them by
the recipient. Monan (1983) has also addressed the familiar
problem of confusion over similar aircraft call signs.
Narrative: cleared to Ii000', descending through FLI80. The
preliminary landing checklist was accomplished and the
current altimeter setting of 29.54" was challenged by the
PNF as ".54 on the altimeters." I (the PF) responded with
".54 checked and set." Upon handoff to Approach Control, the
PNF noticed on his altimeter that we were passing through
5O
i0700'. A quick glance at my altimeter revealed an altitude
of 11700' and an erroneous altimeter setting of 30.54." My
altimeter was indicating 1000' higher than our actual alt. A
climb was initiated immediately to ii000' Since the
erroneous altimeter setting was on the captain's altimeter,
and the altitude alerter receives its info from this same
INS, no altitude deviation alert was sounded. This situation
could have been alleviated by calling out all 4 digits of
the altimeter setting (with particular emphasis on low
settings) and cross-checking to ensure that they are
properly set. An approved company ATIS data card for
terminal weather info to be written on, would also help
correct the situation of having terminal weather read aloud
from the PNF or written on napkins and various pieces of
paper that are placed in different areas in the cockpit.
This would provide standardization with a visual cue card to
review terminal weather info when workload permits, and not
daring a critical phase of flight where you have to listen
to ATC in one ear and ATIS info in the other. (ASRS No.
145761)
We must make a distinction between intra-cockpit communication
errors, which have not been studied extensively for lack of
convenient data (except in accident investigations and some NASA
simulator studies) and extra-cockpit communication by radio.
Intra-cockpit communication is being studied by Kanki and her
collaborators at NASA-Ames. For a preliminary report, see
Veinott and Irwin (1993). Present datalink, such as ACARS,
employs highly restricted input domains, composed of numeric data
and alphanumeric codes entered via keyboard. Although very brief
free-text messages can be composed, the system is essentially
non-verbal. Errors in communication with this system would best
be described as problems within basic human factors engineering:
input hardware (e.g. keyboards versus touch screen devices),
formats, and codes.
Much of the intra-crew exchange of information in the cockpit is
based not on verbal language, but on para-linguistic
communication (Segal, 1990). Movements of the head, hands and
arms, holding up fingers to exchange numerical information, and
other body language is common in the cockpit. Some specific
motions have well understood meanings, as determined by the
context: on takeoff a thumb up by the pilot flying (PF) as a
non-verbal command to raise the landing gear; in climb or
descent, a single finger up means I000 feet to go to target
altitude.
This form of communication is used in place of oral communication
because it is efficient, it is impervious to ambient noise, and
it can be carried on simultaneously with oral communication,
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including radio work. However, it is also highly vulnerable to
human error. Video tapes recorded in a flight simulator, either
for experimental purposes or as part of a LOFT/CRM training
program, illustrate the richness of para-linguistic
communication.
Para-linguistic communication in the cockpit may be an efficient
channel, but it is also highly subject to misinterpretation. It
is generally not encouraged in training and quality management}
except possibly as a redundant measure accompanying the verbal
callout. For example, many pilots call orally for gear up and
make a motion with their hand at the same time, as a form of
deliberate redundancy for the purpose of error checking. In much
the same way a customer entering a noisy restaurant might
indicate to the maitre d' the number of persons in his party by
both stating the number verbally and holding up fingers. The
finger signals would probably be sufficient, and even more
efficient under conditions of either high noise levels, or
language differences. But the customer adds the redundant verbal
channel because it is generally not considered polite, at least
in the U.S., to transmit numerical information exclusively by
hand signals. The cockpit may be an exception, where a
well-established, non-verbal lexicon evolved over the years.
Well-established though the actions may seem, miscommunication by
non-verbal means may result in serious consequences. Consider
the following example related to the author by an airline captain
whose company requires a callout at both 2000 feet and 1000 feet
prior to target altitude.
We were descending rapidly. At 2000 feet prior to our
altitude I held up two fingers. The first officer nodded
and moved the flap handle to the 2-degree position. We were
well above the placard speed for slats and flaps.
It is futile to dream of ever totally removing communication
errors, linguistic or para-linguistic, from the aviation system,
but certainly effective interventions have been made, and can be
made in the future. Para-linguistic communication can be
controlled through standardization (e.g. ground-crew to cockpit
hand signals), but it is not easy. The richness that makes
language so adaptable, the lack of precision that engenders humor
and makes speech a pleasure, also lays a trap for the unwary.
Oral communication can be engineered, as is widely done in the
military, but linguistic engineering and standardization requires
never-ending vigilance. For example, a recent copy of NASA's
ASRS Callback (May 1991) related the confusion over ATC's use of
the verb "circumnavigate", as in "circumnavigate the TCA." One
of the readers comments:
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"For instance, the pilot could be thinking, 'I know what
circumnaviqate means in this situation, but what does the
controller think it means...and what does he really want me
to do?' The words tremain clear of' or 'do not enter' are
not open to misinterpretation, and are more easily
understood than 'circumnavigate'"
One obvious intervention is to eliminate voice communication
where possible, replacing it with electronic datalink (Kerns,
1990). Datalink technology is undergoing rapid development at
this time. The drivers for replacing voice with datalink are not
only error reduction, but reduction of frequency congestion on
voice channels, which is a long-standing problem in air-ground
communication. Police departments have for some time used both
voice and datalink communications to and from patrol cars.
The question of whether datalink will result in an effective
intervention is not one of available technology. Clearly the
technology exists today, and there are no barriers to its
eventual introduction in the system. The problem is whether this
intervention will meet the criteria suggested in Appendix i.
Serious questions can be raised about the possibility of trading
one form of error for another. While we are well aware of the
speaking-hearing errors as documented by Billings and Cheaney
(1981), Monan (1983, 1988), and others, and also by examples from
accident reports, it would be unwise to assume that datalink is
itself error-free. At the transmission end, we are all too aware
of the error-inducing properties of keyboard input, especially
during high-workload and other adverse conditions. At the
receiving end, there are reading errors. System accuracy can be
degraded by many of the same errors that exist in radio
communication, such as numeral, letter, and word transposition,
expectation bias, and many more. We cannot be certain that any
of these will be eliminated by switching to electronic datalink,
with human input and output at each end.
Critics have raised the question of the loss of a valuable
incidental source of information, the so-called "party-line"
which allows crews to garner information from over-hearing the
transmissions between other aircraft and controllers (Midkiff and
Hansman, 1992). The presumption is that party line transmissions
convey valuable incidental information, which enhances the
"situational awareness" of other crews, particularly as they
enter or depart a terminal area. The benefits of the party line
have not been systematically studied; they have only been assumed
to exist. If they do exist, they come at a price: possible
distraction and congestion of human auditory processing channels,
which must process the irrelevant as well as the useful party
line information. If datalink proves to be an effective form of
communication, abandonment of the party line channel may be a
small sacrifice.
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Linquistic Interventions
We have stated previously that oral communication offers
opportunities for intervention strategies. A few examples may
help. As early as World War II, human factors scientists saw
both the need and the opportunity to intervene into
human-to-human voice communication, particularly when noisy
channels are employed. Recognizing the confusion of English
letters when pronounced, the "phonetic alphabet" ensued, later-to
be changed to an "international alphabet", and some words changed
back again, creating great confusion. The confusion created by
this vacillation not withstanding, the phonetic alphabet was a
classic case of a linguistic intervention to prevent transmission
errors.
Words and phrases were also invented to avoid human error. The
contrived term "say again", the restricted use of "cleared" in
ATC instructions, and the contrived pronunciation "niner" have
already been mentioned as examples of specific interventions. A
highly structured ATC lexicon was developed. However, even in
this structured and disciplined linguistic environment,
misunderstanding of the speaker's intended meaning can occur.
The crash of TWA 514 into Mount Weather near Washington, DC in
1974 resulted from lack of an unambiguous interpretation of what
it meant to be "cleared for an approach" (NTSB, 1975). A runway
collision occurred at O'Hare in 1972 because a single word was
omitted from a tower transmission (NTSB, 1973).
Many airlines have established specific, word-for-word expanded
checklists, which spell out in meticulous detail not only the
steps to be taken, but also the callouts and verbal exchanges.
Little is left to the imagination or individual styles of the
crews. The emphasis of the jet age has been on rigid
standardization. More will be said of this when procedures are
discussed in the next section. Still, pilots superimpose their
own individualities on the process.
Degani and Wiener (1990; in preparation) discuss the tendency of
some pilots to superimpose their own language upon that required
by the checklist and company's standard operating procedure. The
motivation for this may be the desire to separate themselves
apart from the rigid standardization of modern flying, or to
inject "humor" into an otherwise monotonous activity (e.g. the
word "gasoline" may be substituted for "fuel" in a checklist
challenge). The author once observed a first officer who, on
making his takeoff "bug" calls, said "V-one-R" (in place of two
required calls, "V-I" and "V-R"), and then for the "V-2" call
substituted "Two of 'em."
This departure from required procedures is a small matter, but it
illustrates the difficulty of maintaining standardization and
discipline, even in a generally well standardized airline.
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Interventions into behavior of this sort are difficult. Such
laxity will always exist, but it must be resisted by all means
possible: through training, unswerving emphasis on
standardization, and constant attention to quality control
through line checks, simulator checks, recurrent training, and
LOFT. Needless to say, the first officer would probably not have
breached the system with a check airman on board. Cockpit
resource management (CRM) training is another feasible
intervention strategy. The captain could have later seized the
opportunity (out of the presence of the author) to practice his
CRM skills by discussing with the first officer, in a
constructive manner, the obviously substandard performance in his
bug speed callouts.
D. TRAINING
Pilot training may be considered a form of intervention strategy.
There is a practical and a regulatory requirement for training.
But in addition to these requirements, training managers may wish
to make curricular interventions, in order to introduce new
equipment, new techniques, or new operating philosophies. In any
of these, the link between the intervention and reduction of
human error may be quite remote; this provides a good example of
a Model B intervention.
There are three levels at which we may consider opportunities for
intervention through training.
Overall Traininq Curriculum
Training curricula are based on statutory requirements of the
FARs. These regulations must be interpreted by each company,
consistent with its own philosophy and resources, as approved by
the FAA. This level would provide only in the broadest sense
opportunities for intervention. In the near future, the FAA's
Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) will offer greater
opportunities for each company to tailor its training program in
accordance with its own philosophy and experience. It is
difficult to say at this time just what opportunities AQP will
offer for interventions aimed at either general or specific human
errors.
The distinction between the next two levels is similar to the
distinction between Specific and Conditional interventions
discussed previously and depicted in Figure II-4.
General Interventions Throuqh Traininq (Model B)
Training offers flight management the opportunity to intervene in
a broad class of problems. The strategy is based on the belief
that the class of problems is more easily attacked as a training
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problem than through discipline, standardization, procedures
changes, or the like. An good example is CRM. CRM training
offers a remedy for a broad, perhaps poorly defined class of
problems, whose origins are inadequate or inappropriate
communication in the cockpit (Wiener, Kanki, and Helmreich,
1993). The intervention comes in the form of a training program
for all pilots. At some carriers the training is extended to
other personnel, such as maintenance, cabin crews, and flight
management. It is no____tremedial training for a handful of
personnel who have been singled out as requiring intervention,
nor is it psychotherapy. CRM training is a broad-scale approach
to social communication-based behaviors and attitudes. It
attempts to change cockpit behavior, not personalities (Foushee
and Helmreich, 1988; Helmreich and Foushee, 1993). It is even
questionable whether attitudes are altered.
CRM training might be an interesting place to apply our list of
guidelines, interesting because many of the questions raised by
our guidelines could not be easily answered. Furthermore, the
value of the intervention must be taken on faith, and a few good
examples. CRM training at United Airlines, one of the pioneers
in the field, was recognized by the captains in two fatal
accidents, a B-747 door separation in flight near Hawaii (NTSB,
1990a); and DC-10 crash in Sioux City, following total loss of
hydraulics, (NTSB, 1990b) as a major factor in their success in
saving as many lives as they did. Such examples are difficult to
come by, since it is usually problems and failures that get
reported, not positive outcomes. Though CRM has generally been
accepted by flight crews as a worthwhile approach, it may not be
able to meet the rigors of our list of criteria. This is be due
to the inherent defect in CRM training, but fact that the
problems for which CRM was developed are themselves poorly
defined, and clear-cut answers are unlikely to be found.
Specific Interventions Throuqh Traininq (Model A)
Interventions designed to meet more specific problems (Model A)
usually fare better than those directed at less well-defined
problems. When a specific problem has been identified training
can be directed toward a possible solution. An example of
training to avoid foreseeable human error is windshear escape
maneuvers. During the last decade, windshear became a major
safety concern, with little agreement on how pilots should
maneuver their aircraft to avoid terrain, while also avoiding
low-altitude aerodynamic stalls. One procedure called for
increasing the angle of attack until stick shaker stall warnings
were obtained, and then "flying the shaker." Training programs
for windshear escape were formulated, and introduced to the
pilots at their next simulator check. The training requirement
for glass cockpit aircraft is simplified by hardware. These
aircraft have pitch angle guidance for windshear escape depicted
directly on the ADI. A yellow horizontal line commands the
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nose-up pitch angle to be followed, and the resulting angle of
attack is kept just below the level for stick shaker actuation.
We end the discussion of training with a word of caution. There
has been some tendency in the past to regard any operational
human error as addressable by training. There has been an
unfortunate tendency to treat a training department as a dumping
ground for inadequate design of hardware or software. The first
line against human error must be the designer.
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IV. INTERVENTION STRATEGIES: ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES
A. EMPLOYMENT OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES
In this section we shall discuss intervention strategies for the
management of human error. Error management must be
distinguished from error reduction or elimination. "Management"
in this sense means that one strives to build into systems and
operators methods by which one can either eliminate or reduce
human error, or if this is not possible, to minimize its
consequences. The computer technologies upon which such methods
depend are not necessarily new; some have existed in
computer-based systems for years. The discussion concentrates
upon the on-board computers on the advanced technology aircraft.
Assistance from ground-based computers may be required for some
interventions. Some of the techniques which we discuss will take
us to the doorstep of artificial intelligence (AI), but not
beyond.
Our aim is to employ the capabilities of modern on-board
computers to negate the effects of human error. The computer
takes on the role of being one (or perhaps more than one) line of
defense, protecting the system from human error. Our distal goal
is to ensure system effectiveness and safety. We seek to achieve
this by satisfying a proximal goal, the management of human
error.
Some methods of error management are designed to prevent an error
from occurring in the first place, or to prevent it from entering
the system; others will allow an error to enter the system, but
will make the error more apparent to the operator so that he/she
can correct it. Still other techniques will trap the error,
preventing it from adversely affecting the system: the operator
will be alerted by some means and have the opportunity to make
the necessary changes. Intelligent warning and alerting systems
may also play a role in defending the system from error.
The Impact of Cockpit Automation
The history of cockpit automation has been told by Billings
(1991). Wiener (1988a, pp. 444-451) explored the question "Why
automate?". Since the role of human factors in flight deck
automation is documented by these and other authors, this report
will offer only a scant introduction to the subject. Figure IV-I
displays the history of autoflight.
Cockpit automation began in the mid-1930's with the introduction
of crude autopilots. Autopilot development has enjoyed
uninterrupted growth since the early models. By the 1950's more
sophisticated models could be found on aircraft of the Super
Constellation and DC-6 era. Development continued into the jet
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age, as autopilots and flight directors became components of
flight guidance systems, which included area navigation (RNAV),
and rudimentary autothrottles. Other devices such as autoslats,
autospoilers, and autobrakes became part of the automation
package.
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Figure IV-I. A chronology of aircraft
automation. From Billings (1991).
It was not until the late 1970's that modern flight-deck
automation flourished, driven by the rapid development of the
microprocessor. In 1982 Boeing introduced the B-767, the first
of the "glass cockpit" (more correctly EFIS - electronic flight
instrument system) passenger aircraft. Other Boeing models, and
those of other manufacturers followed. By the end of the decade,
glass cockpits were offered to the airline industry by all major
manufacturers of large airliners, as well as many manufacturers
of smaller aircraft operated by the regional carriers. Glass
cockpits can also be found in corporate and military aircraft.
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The new cockpit designs combined many of the previously existing
devices with new features, based on a sophisticated inertial
reference system (IRS) and color computer graphic
instrumentation. The computer graphic ("glass") displays not
only replaced the traditional ("iron") electro-mechanical
instruments, but also allowed a wide variety of information to be
displayed which had not be available previously, e.g. a wind
vector; a path predictor vector; navaids and airports,
superimposed color radar; and a moving map on the horizontal
situation indicator (HSI). Some of these features can be seen in
Figure IV-2, which depicts a glass HSI in the map mode. Note the
two shaded areas representing superimposed (color) radar returns.
The three-segment line curving forward and to the right of the
airplane symbol is the path predictor vector.
In Wiener's study of pilot reaction to the glass cockpit (1989b),
the HSI map display was consistently mentioned as the favorite
feature of the new aircraft. Furthermore, color radar can be
superimposed on the HSI map display, a capability also
universally praised by airline crews. These displays also
allowed pilot selection and deselection of information (e.g.
emergency airfields on the map), and switch-selectable options
for instrument configuration, a feature not possible prior to the
EFIS era. The pilot has at his/her fingertips a vast storehouse
of information which previously was either not available, or had
to be extracted from charts, tables, hand-held (mostly analog)
computers, and manuals.
Error Protection
The on-board computers also offered some novel features that
could be considered interventions for protection against human
error. For example, the flight management computer (FMC) could
recognize and reject certain cases of input that were outside of
its domain. While the FMC of today can recognize and reject
inputs because they are stylistically incorrect, it generally
lacks the intelligence to detect inputs which are illogical or
wildly incorrect, but in the proper form.
Pilots are forced to enter information in a rigid format, which
in one sense may be a defense against input errors, but in
another sense creates a less user-friendly device. Why should a
crew have to worry about whether or not a slash ("/") is required
between the latitude and longitude? On one flight in a glass
aircraft, the author observed the crew struggle to establish a
latitude and longitude ("lat and lon") waypoint (as required by a
change in their clearance) to no avail. There were three
different types of errors in their input, for a total of five
errors in merely establishing a waypoint. The struggle continued
until the captain thought of looking on another CDU page to
discover the proper format, which he then mimicked in order to
establish the waypoint (Wiener, 1993).
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Other input errors result in error messages (e.g. "not in
database") in the CDU scratchpad. The ability of the FMC to
check fuel burn to destination against current fuel load has
already been mentioned in Chapter II as an example of machine
intelligence. Such an error message also serves as an example of
Wiener and Curry's assertion (1980) that, in contrast with the
traditional view that the human should serve as a monitor of a
machine (Howland and Wiener, 1963), automation has enabled the
opposite doctrine: the machine should monitor the human.
The B-767/757, and the glass cockpit aircraft that followed,
possessed rudimentary forms of computer-based error elimination
and protection. The A-320, introduced in 1988, took error
protection a step further. The fly-by-wire feature offered the
opportunity to fly maneuvers such as maximum safe angle of attack
(AOA) for windshear escape, with no danger of entering a stall.
The computer would simply stop the aircraft's increase in pitch
short of its computed safe AOA. If the pilot continued to pull
back on the stick, no more nose-up pitch would be commanded. An
intelligent computer interposes an electronic line of defense
between the pilot's control and the aircraft's control surfaces.
Other EFIS aircraft such as the 757/756 offer escape guidance on
the attitude director indicator (ADI) in the form of a target
line for optimal nose-up pitch, as described in the previous
chapter. In contrast with the approach taken in the A-320
design, the pilot remains in the loop (presumably). The pilot
controls the pitch angle; the computer merely computes and
displays the commanded nose-up pitch.
These two approaches emphasize not only disparate views of
cockpit design, but basic philosophical design differences: the
A-320 essentially allows the pilot to pull the control stick all
the way back and let the computer find the maximum angle of
attack which will avoid a stall. Other EFIS aircraft depend on
the pilot to follow the windshear escape guidance cues. It is
impossible to say which approach is more effective. Only time
and experience will settle that question.
Error Prevention Throuqh Automation
It may seem ironic that the author takes the position that while
current generation cockpit automation has not lived up to the
designers' and operators' dreams of eliminating human error at
its source, more use of automation in future generation aircraft
may offer a solution.
The answers lie in creating error-resistant designs which
reliably (I) employ automation to detect errors; or (2) predict
errors before they mature, warn the crews, and suggest solutions.
The doctrine can be stated as follows: use traditional human
factors methods to prevent error where possible. In those cases
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where human errors penetrate the first lines of defense,
automation must then detect, display, and ultimately "trap" the
error and not allow it to adversely affect the system.
Much of what the author proposes requires the development of more
intelligent human-computer interfaces, and the expanded use of
machine intelligence. This invokes the fundamental human factors
question of which functions should be assigned to humans and
which to machines. The issue, of course, is not what machine-or
humans do better, but how the assets of each can be combined to
produce an effective system. There is no need to review the
question here; the reader is referred to papers by Wiener and
Curry (1980), Chambers and Nagel (1985), Fadden and Weener(1984), Price (1987), Speyer (1987), and Billings (1991).
GUIDELINE NO. 14
An intervention should not produce conflicts with present
equipment and procedures already in place (e.g. TCAS and
GPWS giving conflicting vertical commands).
B. ERROR MANAGEMENT
In this section we shall discuss a variety of error management
techniques which depend on at least present-day computer
technology. We will consider the capabilities and limitations of
this technology, as well as those additional developments which
would be required by proposed intervention strategies.
Specific Error Intervention
Under the heading of error management, we will discuss
computer-based interventions. Our aim is to find means of
employing on-board computers to manage entire classes of errors
(e.g. erroneous waypoint locations, illogical navigational
requests, or illogical commanded airspeeds). Occasionally
techniques are needed for protection from a more restricted class
of errors. We would like the flexibility of computer software to
be cordial to modification to meet a particular problem.
A current example is a new aural warning system that is being
retrofitted onto existing A-320 aircraft, and installed as basic
equipment on future A-320/330/340s. The system will warn the
flight crew should they enter a low-energy flight regime. The
device is the result of two accidents involving A-320s in which
the aircraft flew too low and slow to recover before striking
terrain. According to an Airbus Industrie official, the system
is "designed to protect the aircraft when pilots are flying
manually - meaning the autopilot and autothrottle are
disconnected." The data used are the aircraft's speed, angle of
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attack, deceleration rate, and engine thrust (AWST, 1991, p. 30).
Feedback and Feedforward Mechanisms
The ability of the computer to provide feedback and feedforward
information enhances the operator's knowledge of the state and
future state of the system. Feedback provides the operator with
information on the impact of his/her control inputs. Feedforw-ard
mechanisms predict and display the future state of the system,
which may provide guidance for control inputs. Feedforward is
seldom an inherent part of the system; it must be inserted
artificially. Feedback may be inherent to the system (e.g.
pre-stall buffet), or may be artificially inserted or enhanced
(e.g. electronic stall warning devices).
Feedback. One of the virtues of computer graphic systems is
their ability to enhance feedback. However, this capability has
not always been exploited to its full potential. A persistent
complaint about automatic systems is their inherent paucity of
feedback. Norman (1990) has written on this subject, and
attributes the problem to designers who are not sensitive to the
need to deliver feedback to the operators, since it would appear
to the designer that everything is working as planned. Norman
gives several interesting examples where the aircraft's
automation compensated for system's failures. One case involved
a gradual power loss in the Number 4 engine of a B-747; the other
a potentially catastrophic fuel leak. In both cases, the crew
was unaware that anything was wrong. The automation silently and
efficiently compensated for the power loss and the fuel
imbalance, to the extent that the crew was unaware of both the
basic unhealthy condition and the computer's efforts to deal with
it.
In these examples, it is clear that the automation is so highly
capable of providing compensation that the crew was unaware of
the abnormal conditions. There are two dangers here:
i) The crew incorrectly believes that things are normal, when
human intervention (beyond the authority of the automation)
may soon be required.
2) If automation fails, the crew may have little awareness of
the condition that led to the failure, to the possible
detriment of recovery.
Norman argues that the problem with systems that seem to be
troublesome is not overuse of automation, but lack of feedback.
In these two examples it would have been desirable for the system
to inform the crew that it was compensating to an unusual degree,
as if to say, "Captain, I am steadily increasing aileron to keep
this plane on its heading, so something must be creating
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asymmetric thrust, and what's more it is getting worse." Such a
dialogue is not entirely fanciful. With the sophistication of
modern flight guidance systems, it should not be difficult to
enhance the feedback in this manner. The difficulty would not
lie in developing the software or hardware, but in producing a
system intelligent enough to provide feedback enhancement for a
vast number of conditions that might arise, including those which
the designers may not have anticipated.
Norman goes on to state that the problem with today's automation
is that its intelligence is at the wrong level; it is both too
high and too low. He finds current automation level high enough
to do most of the jobs and do them dependably, but not high
enough to provide feedback to the crew, or to avoid problems of
information transfer when the human must take control. His point
is interesting: that we need computer-based systems that are
either a little dumber or a little smarter. Cook, Woods,
McColligan and Howie (1990), and Wiener (1988b) complain of
"clumsy" automation: modern systems that require excessive human
monitoring, increasing rather than relieving human workload.
Both of Norman's examples come from traditional jet aircraft.
Modern aircraft have their own problems, perhaps at a more
sophisticated level. If Norman is correct, the modern glass
cockpits offer novel opportunities for human error due to lack of
feedback. One such problem is an incorrect positional
representation on the HSI map mode. If a programming error is
made, for example a non-matching runway and ILS frequency is
selected, the HSI map position will not conform to the ILS
course. Also if the IRUs are not updating the FMC position of
the aircraft, a map shift can occur, where the map is not located
correctly with respect to the aircraft. It is not always easy to
detect. Many of the pilots interviewed by the author have a map
shift story to tell. The difficulty here is also lack of
feedback. The HSI map display is so compelling and so helpful
that pilots become dependent on it, and perhaps less critical of
what they see than they should be. Since the shift may not be
geographically great, it may go unnoticed. The pilot would be
better off if the map display disappeared entirely. The
following ASRS report illustrates a problem with feedback from
glass instruments and a map display.
Narrative: aircraft was coupled to autopilot and autopilot
was armed for the ILS (8L at Atlanta). Aircraft intercepted
and captured localizer at approximately 15 nm from airfield.
At 5000' I identified localizer. As per company procedure,
captain rotated hdg select knob to 340 deg for missed
approach heading, but unknown to either of us this
multifunction knob was pushed in far enough to activate "hdg
hold". I did not notice the flight mode annunciator (FMA)
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window change from "loc trk" [localizer track] to "hdg hld"
[heading hold]. Of course, the ADI (flight director) display
remained as before with the pitch bar giving altitude hold
at 5000' and the bank bar still centered but centered
because we were on heading not localizer. Obviously we
gradually started to drift right. The HSI (nav display) was
selected on map mode (20 mi scale). On this scale a small
deviation off localizer is too small to detect. I monitored
the glide slope (raw data display) and saw it descend
through the flight director pitch bar. I looked at the FMA
and realized we were no longer armed for the ILS. I
immediately announced to the captain and disconnected the
autopilot to start descent and selected arc mode on the nay
display. I saw we were full scale localizer deflection so I
put in about a 15 deg correction to course. At that moment
Atlanta Approach called to tell us we were drifting into the
parallel ILS course and he told us to maintain 4500' until
established. (He also gave us a hdg to correct). I leveled
at 4700' and as I did the localizer centered up and the ILS
was resumed uneventfully. Having map mode in HSI instead of
arc does not make a localizer deviation immediately obvious.
Lack of continuous cross-check of FMA by pilots is a factor.
Hdg select knob doubles as hdg hold button and an
imperceptible extra push in on it activates heading hold. To
correct the problem: fly ILS with arc (or rose) in map to
make deviations immediately obvious. Additionally,
multifunction knobs should not be accepted on aircraft. It
is simply too easy at night when you are tired or distracted
to activate the wrong function. (In the this aircraft we
have 3 multifunction knobs where different functions are
activated depending on how far in you push the knob. It can
be very tricky sometimes). (ASRS No. 141226)
Feedforward. Some systems have the capability to furnish
the operator with a predicted view of the future progress of the
system. This provides an opportunity to enhance situational
awareness and provide guidance for future actions. This
principle has been called "feedforward". [Note: "feedforward"
as used in human factors is not equivalent to the term as used in
control theory]. Feedforward is also frequently employed in
training, where the same mechanism is called "cueing." The
trainee is informed, either by a living instructor or an
inanimate device, of actions to be taken. Cueing has proven
particularly helpful in motor skills training.
The most familiar example of feedforward to be found in aviation
is the flight director. This device cues the pilot as to heading
and pitch to obtain in order to achieve his short-term goal (e.g.
intercept and follow glide path and localizer) as computed from
information set into the mode control panel, and in the case of
glass cockpits, the CDU.
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As with feedback, feedforward can be implemented with relative
ease on computer-driven displays. The B-767/757, for example,
supports a flight-path predictor vector in the HSI map mode. It
is a white, three-segment line displayed ahead of the aircraft
symbol (see Figure IV-2). If the aircraft enters a turn, the
white line curves in that direction, showing the future
trajectory of the aircraft. The segments represent 30, 60, and
90 seconds into the future. To roll out on a given course as
depicted on the map (e.g. an ILS localizer), the pilot can easily
make use of the feedforward information and adjust the rate of
turn. The white vector is continually recomputed and displayed;
it provides both feedforward and feedback. The pilot sets an
initial angle of bank; the white curved segments on the display
feed information forward about the future track of the aircraft
for that angle of bank, speed, and wind. Feedforward becomes
feedbacE with respect to the appropriateness of the angle of bank
that has chosen for the desired intercept, and the pilot can make
an adjustment in bank angle and immediately view the new
projected flight path.
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Figure IV-2. Horizontal situation indicator (HSI) display
from a generic glass cockpit. Note the three-segment
flight-path predictor vector ahead of the aircraft symbol
and superimposed radar return. From Billings (1991).
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Error-Evident Displays
Another line of defense against error is to make the error, once
it enters the system, more conspicuous to the crew. Such an
mechanism does not prevent the original error, nor does it ensure
error tolerance. What it does is to provide the crew a better
opportunity to detect their own error and remove it before it
affects the functioning of the system. The author has referred
to these as "error-evident displays" (1989a). The map mode of
the horizontal situation indicator (HSI) of the EFIS aircraft
provides an excellent example. Lateral navigational errors show
up very clearly in the map mode. Error evident displays can be
thought of as a form of feedback, at times employing feedforward
(see example below).
The inter-relationship between feedforward and feedback can be
found in the "plan" mode of the HSI map display, which allows the
crew to step through the lateral course after it is entered is an
error-evident system at its best. In this mode, the crew steps
through the lateral flight plan one waypoint at a time. The next
waypoint in line appears to move toward the aircraft symbol.
Thus, the crew would be alerted if there were an illogical entry,
a severe turn, or an inconsistent position on the course. With
waypoint-to-waypoint navigation, an erroneously located waypoint
would cause the course line to appear on the map with some highly
suspect orientation, probably a sharp bend, which would alert the
crew.
The author once observed a perfect example of this capability
while aboard a B-767 preparing to depart Atlanta for Miami. The
clearance included as a waypoint the TEPEE (note spelling)
intersection near Tampa. The captain entered TEEPE (note
spelling) into the Route page of the CDU. Because there is a
TEEPE intersection (near Waco, Texas), the CDU dutifully accepted
the erroneous spelling and established it as a waypoint on the
route from Atlanta to Miami (see Figure IV-3). The sudden shift
in course to the west-southwest toward TEEPE from the southward
course toward TEPEE was immediately evident to the crew. A
non-EFIS aircraft with the same CDU/FMS (such as some models of
the B-737-300) would not have provided this form of error
detection capability. The crew would have had to detect the
error by some other check, but whatever the method used, it would
lack the rich, error-evident depiction found on the HSI map.
Two points should be made regarding this example. First, the
willingness of the FMC to accept such a clearly erroneous
waypoint is an example of what the author has called the "Two
'D's" of automation: dumb and dutiful. Dumb in the sense that
it will readily accept illogical input; dutiful in the sense that
the computer will attempt to fly whatever is put in. Had the
crew not intervened, the flight guidance system would have
attempted to fly to TEEPE. Probably the "insufficient fuel"
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message would have been triggered: the aircraft would not have
had the fuel to fly from Atlanta to Miami via Texas. In this had
occurred, the computer would have detected an error and alerted
the crew, albeit for the wrong reason. Later in this chapter we
shall discuss the potential for on-board computers to act more
intelligently and possibly detect anomalies, rather than merely
display inputs that do not conform with the stated desires (e.g.
original and destination) of the crew.
Then we may ask why the FAA has let stand so many possible
pitfalls for crews, of which the TEEPE and TEPEE intersections
are such a clear example. In the age of the FMS, the spellings
and pronunciations of intersections and VORs has taken on new
meaning (see Wiener, 1988a, pp. 454-455, and Figure IV-4 of this
report). Intervention strategies for this problem are obvious.
ATL
TEEPE
TEPEE  MIA
Figure IV-3. Map depiction of the location of
TEPEE and TEEPE intersections.
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Many of the navigational errors resulting from keyboard input
described by Aarons (1988) might have prevented if the course
could have been visualized. The example given in Wiener (1988a,
p. 454) illustrates the peril of loading an incorrect waypoint,
and the means of managing such an error. In this example, two
pairs of VORs with identical names (Las Vegas and Farmington) are
depicted. If the wrong waypoint were entered, the flight
management computer would dutifully attempt to fly the course.
Figure IV-4. Map depiction of two pairs of VORs with same names
but different abbreviations. From Wiener (1985b and 1988).
Reprinted with permission of Society of Automotive Engineers.
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The possibility of such an error is not fanciful. An actual case
of entering the wrong Farmington is revealed in the following
ASRS report:
Cleared direct to Farmington. F/O loaded direct intercept
to "FAM" and executed same. About a minute and a half
later, captain loads direct intercept to "FMN" (also on our
filed and cleared route of flight) and comments "it's 1061
miles to Farmington." This aroused my curiosity, and I
noticed he had loaded Farmington, New Mexico (FMN) after I
had correctly loaded Farmington, Missouri (FAM). Navaids
with the same name, or same sounding names, are obvious
areas for potential ambiguity, particularly with RNAV
aircraft that can navigate direct to any point in the world.
(ASRS No. 93876)
In this case it was the ability of the FMC to compute and display
the distance to the active (direct intercept) waypoint, not the
map display, that saved the day. Some aircraft have stored
waypoint capability (FMC) without the glass HSI display; we do
not know the type aircraft in the report above. It would be
possible that the aircraft's route of flight was, more or less,
on a line connecting FAM with FMN. In such a case, course
deviation may not be evident on the HSI map.
Crews interviewed in the author's field study of glass cockpit
operations (Wiener, 1989b) who had left the 757 to transition
back to less advanced aircraft stated that the one feature they
miss the most was the HSI map. They saw it as a great advance in
safety, partly because of its ability to enhance situational
awareness with respect to position, but also for its capability
to display suitable emergency airports.
One could speculate that if the error-evidentiary capabilities of
the glass cockpit had been present in the L-1011 that came within
a few feet of colliding with a B-747 in Canadian air space over
the Atlantic (Canadian Aviation Safety Board, 1989), the
erroneous waypoint would have been apparent to the crew, and
would have been corrected. Although there are error checking
methods for traditional stored waypoint RNAV systems (see FAA AC
90-79, July 1980) none can compare with the graphic depiction
found in the EFIS cockpit. Some error checking procedures
involve doing essentially what the crew did in the Farmington
example -- checking the distance to the waypoint against their
flight plan, or as in the example above, against their own logic,
and their personal stored database of "reasonable" distances.
One distinction needs to be made. The error-evident display does
not have the intelligence to detect errors. It is merely a
display system, and the management of human error ultimately
depends on human intelligence to detect the error. Note that the
767 FMC did not balk at accepting "TEEPE" as a waypoint to be
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crossed between Atlanta and Miami. The design implication is
that displays can be provided to aid in the management of error
by increasing the probability that human intelligence will be
sufficient to detect the error. In the next section we shall
encounter systems that depend on machine intelligence and logic
to perform these functions.
Goal-Sharinq (Intent-Driven) Systems
It would seem prudent to build into systems the capability for
the crew to inform the machine of its strategic intent (e.g. to
fly from Paris to Miami), a capability that exists in the modern
systems. Then all input would be checked for consistency with
this intent, a capability that rarely exists. In such systems,
error management would occur, not because errors were excluded,
but because they would be automatically detected, and the crew
advised of input inconsistent with the stated goal. Thus, using
the example from the previous section, a waypoint badly out of
line with a reasonable route of flight (the wrong Farmington)
would be brought to the crew's attention. Many of the dramatic
incidents and accidents reported in recent years might have been
avoided had this capability existed. The virtue of goal-sharing
and error-evident displays is that they allow the error to be
trapped, rather than allowing it to affect the system.
In FMC-based systems, it is possible for the crew to input their
strategic goal in very direct and unambiguous language, e.g.
entering the origin and destination of a flight. Thus the goal
of the operator is entirely clear to the system.
It is essential to maintain the distinction between goal-sharing
and error-evident displays. In goal-sharing, it is the machine
that must detect and report the anomaly. This might require
development of artificial intelligence systems that may not be
available today. For lateral navigation, the task may not be
difficult. The course entered by the crew could be subjected to
a series of logical tests, asking essentially if each waypoint is
consistent with the one before and after, and if all are
consistent with the stated intent (origin and destination) of the
flight. Other types of errors might be more difficult to detect.
Another approach would be to allow an intelligent machine to
infer the intent of the crew, based on recent history of the
crew's inputs. This subject has been explored by Geddes (date
unknown). It is too early to tell whether this procedure truly
has promise for error reduction, or whether incorrect inferences
might introduce more error than they remove. Also one may raise
questions as to (I) why such a capability is needed in transport
flight, as possibly contrasted with combat flight; (2) the
degree of machine intelligence required to support it; and (3)
the probability and effect of errors of inference.
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Intent inferencing has enjoyed a certain popularity in the AI
community in recent years, particularly in air combat
applications, and no doubt will be further researched in the
future. Developments in this field bear watching. For the
present, the author's position is that error management could be
advanced by intelligent machines that depend on the crew sharing
its intent with the machine by direct communication. The
immediate problem is not the determination of intent, but the
development of machine intelligence that can detect and report
inputs that are inconsistent with the stated intent, and do so
without generating excessive false alarms.
Intelliqent Warninq and Alertinq Systems
Most warning and alerting systems have grown up piecemeal in the
cockpit, often being added one-by-one as the result of accidents
(Wiener and Curry, 1980). The new glass cockpit warning systems,
such as Boeing's EICAS and Airbus' ECAM have halted and reversed
the continual upward spiral of the number of alerts in the
cockpit. This is depicted in Figure IV-5, using the Boeing
767/757 as an example.
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Figure IV-5. The growth of warning devices. From Morton (1982).
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There is far more to warnings and alerts than merely the classic
human engineering decisions about how they should be displayed.
Computers now offer the opportunity for far more intelligent
devices, which can analyze systems, prioritize alerts, offer
solutions or even probabilistic diagnoses, and display systems
schematics for diagnosis and intervention (features currently
found in the A-320, MD-II, and B-747-400).
In 1980, Wiener and Curry introduced the concept of the
"electronic cocoon", a metaphorical, multivariate protective
shell around the aircraft. As long as the plane stayed within
the cocoon, the crew would be free to operate as they saw fit,
within the bounds of reason. If the aircraft penetrated the
cocoon, the crew would be alerted. (See the discussion of
"Predictive Systems" below).
The 1980s generation transports (e.g. B-757/767, MD-88, and
A-310/320) have made great strides in reducing and simplifying
the alerting systems. Today's warning and alerting systems are
still essentially unintelligent systems that detect abnormal
conditions when they occur, lacking the intelligence to predict
problems or to detect erroneous input.
A welcome counter-example is the 767/757 fuel monitoring system
previously mentioned. This is a large step in the direction of
more intelligent warning systems. The insufflcient fuel warning
not only monitors the progress of a flight under normal
conditions, but it may also, as a "side-effect", detect erroneous
course input, as the author pointed out in the TEPEE/TEEPE error.
Let us suppose in the example of the VORs with identical names
that the crew was flying from Dallas to San Francisco and
selected the wrong Farmington (Missouri) (see Figure IV-4). Even
in an FMC-equipped aircraft without an HSI map (e.g., B-737-300
non-EFIS), the computer would probably catch the error because
the incorrect course would trigger an insufficient fuel message.
This would provide crew with a warning of its lateral
navigational error, but for the wrong reason. This illustrates
"trapping" an error. The incorrect input enters the system, but
it is not allowed to affect it, and the crew is notified. At
this point the error has not been identified, and crew must find
and correct it.
Predictive Systems
In some cases it is not sufficient simply to alert the crew as
soon as an alarm condition exists. An intelligent system should
be able to predict trouble before alarm conditions are reached,
allowing an alert before the "electronic cocoon" is penetrated.
In an earlier paper the author gave as an example the prediction
of over-consumption of engine oil (Wiener, 1985b). In a 757 the
EICAS set point is five quarts, at which time the crew is
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alerted. The author wrote that it would seem only wise to allow
the computer to do more than merely monitoring and displaying
present oil levels. It could continuously forecast future
levels, and inform the crew if one might become critical before
reaching the destination.
About a year later the author interviewed a 757 captain who
related a story involving a flight from New York to San
Francisco. In the 757 he had developed his own personal
technique of calling up the EICAS (engine indicating and crew
alerting system) pages once each hour. (See Degani and Wiener,
1991, and in preparation, for the difference between procedures
and techniques.) Upon doing so east of the Detroit area, he
discovered that one engine was low on oil. He contacted the
company, who advised him to continue monitoring oil quantity.
Since the over-consumption continued, and the captain made the
decision to divert to Detroit.
Had he not had this "personal procedure", he might have continued
into the western part of the U.S., where airports with adequate
facilities are far apart, before being alerted at the five-quart
set point, causing at least a diversion to an airport less
adequate for both maintenance and passenger service. If it had
been an over-water flight, the situation would have been more
critical. We are long overdue in developing systems that can
forecast trouble, rather than merely waiting for it to occur.
Predictive alerts are a special form of feedforward, and should
not be a difficult problem for an on-board computer. Sensors
already aboard the aircraft feed information on the present state
of systems to the FMC. It should not be difficult for the
computer to use forecasting algorithms to predict future states
of the systems being sampled. An alarm logic would determine the
need to alert the crew, based on design decisions such as how far
forward (in time) to predict, and how far backward in time to
include samples in the forecasting equations. Mathematical
forecasting techniques such as exponential smoothing allow the
forecasting equation to place relatively higher weights on recent
experience than on aging experience, thus looking backward, but
mathematically discounting the importance of "ancient history."
System Recovery
A final step in error management is system recovery. This
concept requires that once an error is detected, there must be a
effective means of removing it and allowing the system to
recover. In brief, we want to be certain that our system does
not permit irreversible errors.
The first step is detection: this has been covered partially in
our discussion of feedback, and error-evident displays.
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Detection is a function of the extent to which the system
properly displays abnormal conditions, and the ability of the
human to monitor the displays. The subject of human vigilance in
automated systems has been extensively researched, and is well
documented (Mackie, 1987; Wiener, 1987a; Coblentz, 1989).
The next step is to make certain that the crew has an escape for
any error they may make, the reversibility criterion. With
traditional aircraft, this was usually not a problem. Working
with less sophisticated systems, the pilots were closely coupled
to the machine; an error once detected could usually be reversed
quite easily. The advent of highly sophisticated automation
raises the question of escape from error and system recovery.
Generally the problem is not that the error is irreversible, but
that the recovery process can be difficult, time-consuming, and
possibly error-inducing itself.
A familiar example of system recovery from error is file or text
restoration in a personal computer. The most vexing error that
most of us make (short of erasing an entire disk system) is to
erase text, or more seriously an entire file, and then discover
that we would like to have it back. Fortunately the software
designers usually give us at least a limited way out. Text and
files can often be "unerased."
C. SUMMARYOF MANAGEMENT ECHNIQUES
In summary, we would like systems to possess the following
characteristics, given that an error has been entered, or that an
alarm condition exists:
i. The anomaly is conspicuous.
2. The condition is diagnosable, and the effect of the error
on the system is clear.
3. There exists a recovery technique.
4. The recovery technique is (if possible) simple, rapid, and
error-resistant.
5. The technique has low probability of error itself (it
should not be easy to make things worse).
6. The system is either unaffected during the time that the
error was present, or can recover quickly and totally when
it is removed.
7. It is clear to the operator when the error has been
cleared, and if necessary, that the system is awaiting
corrected input.
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V. CONCLUSIONSAND OVERVIEW
A. HUMAN ERROR CAN BE MANAGED
To err is human; to manage human error is sublime. Previous
chapters have made it clear that it is possible for those who
design and operate aviation operations, and other high-risk
systems, to erect lines of defense against error, and to
intervene in both general and specific ways to protect the
systems. Furthermore, we have seen that this is possible in both
traditional and advanced technology aircraft. As many authors
have pointed out, the high technology aircraft offer new
opportunities for human error (Wiener and Curry, 1980; Wiener,
1988a; Billings, 1991; Demosthenes and Oliver, 1991; Woods, 1989,
1990). Cook, Woods, McColligan, and Howie (1990) have discussed
the same phenomenon in medical applications.
It is equally important to recognize that the new technologies
also offer ways and means for management of error that are not
available with traditional aircraft. Any limitations in the
exploitation of this technology lie not in technology itself, but
in the resourcefulness of persons who can affect intervention.
Thus we may conclude that the computers which drive the modern
cockpit technology provide opportunities previously unknown for
both the commission of and the control of human error.
In Chapter I the concept of cascaded lines of defense against
human error was introduced. Chapter IV provides the framework
for more global lines of defense, five levels at which technology
and humans may combine to manaqe rather than necessarily prevent
error. These lines of defense are:
. Prevent the error in the first place, or make it as unlikely
as possible. This is done through design, training,
procedures, management, and quality assurance.
. If an error is introduced into the system, make it as
conspicuous as possible through display design and
traditional human factors ("error evident" displays).
.
If the first two methods fail to block or remove the error,
design the system, probably through software, to trap the
error and prevent it from affecting the system. This level
of defense may or may not require further developments in
artificial intelligence.
4. Provide sophisticated warning and alerting systems.
5. Make certain that there is a recovery path from any error.
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GUIDELINE NO. 15
Above all, the intervention strategy should be effective. It
must be demonstrated to achieve the safety gain for which it
was designed. Its effectiveness should be evaluated in
advance by all means possible, including simulation, and
post-intervention evaluations should be conducted. This is
often far easier to do with hardware interventions than more
subtle strategies. For example, though its usefulness is
now generally accepted, what proof do we have that the
sterile cockpit rule has been effective? Compare this to,
let us say, TCAS, where industry could "keep score" on the
number of traffic advisories (TA's) and resolution
advisories (RA's), allowing it to infer the number of
near-midair collisions or collisions avoided.
B. MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
In this section we shall discuss the process by which
intervention strategies are warranted, designed, and implemented.
The reader is again referred to Appendix I, for the list of
guidelines for the design of interventions.
Warrants for Intervention
The first question is how we ascertain that an intervention is
required (see Guideline No. I, Appendix I). The usual
indications for intervention to manage error are:
i. Accidents, incidents, and violations
. Quality assurance methods (check airmen, simulator
instructors, FAA air carrier inspectors and designates)
,
o
Reporting systems (e.g. NASA's ASRS; company irregularity
reports)
Reports from pilots outside of established reporting
systems, often word-of-mouth (e.g. pilots' union committees,
direct contact with company personnel such as chief pilots,
supervisors, etc.)
Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up Strateqies
Degani and Wiener (1991; in preparation) have proposed a
framework for establishment of flight-deck procedures (see Figure
V-l). To a great extent the same methodology applies to
intervention. These reports stress the role of management in
determining its philosophies and strategic goals as a step
preliminary to establishing flight procedures.
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The novelty of the Degani-Wiener approach is that it emphasizes a
top-down methodology, in which flight management first determines
its overall operating philosophy; this in turn determines
policies (broad statements of the way the company wants things
done). From policies flow procedures. Contrast this with a
bottom-up process, whereby the equipment or flight requirement
itself determines the procedures, as if it exists in isolation.
Such an approach leads to inconsistent, possibly conflicting,
procedurization. In a later paper Degani and Wiener (in
preparation) added a fourth "P" for "Practices" - what is
actually practiced in the cockpit where a procedure is called
for. The Four "P" model recognizes that all planning is not
top-down; that bottom-up influences also exist; practices may
affect procedures.
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Figure V-l. The top-down design of flight-deck procedures, using
the "Four P's": Philosophies, policies, procedures, and
Practices. From Degani and Wiener (in preparation).
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If one accepts the approach depicted above, it means that each
company (perhaps also the FAA and the manufacturer) must proceed
in the same way with intervention strategies, yielding
philosophies and policies that will guide in the design and
implementation of the intervention. For example, one company may
favor hardware interventions (e.g. interlocks), another
documentation (e.g. checklist modifications), and a third may
have a philosophy that leads to behaviorally based methods (e.g.
training, discipline, etc.)
Organizations (airlines, governmental agencies, manufacturers)
may have philosophies and policies that lead to a preferred
method of intervention. In the end each will chose that
intervention strategy that is considered most effective, often
based on hunches and opinions, rather than on sound human factors
principles. Whatever the method, the author recommends that any
proposed intervention be held up against the guidelines in
Appendix i. As with any list of guidelines (see also Appendix 2
and 3), there will never be a perfect fit, but the guidelines
will provide at least a preliminary assessment of any proposed
intervention strategy. Guidelines may also be employed as a
method of comparison when there are competing candidates for
intervention strategies.
Mechanistic vs. Behaviorally Based Strateqies
So far we have discussed a variety of interventions, involving:
i) hardware and documentation, and 2) some behaviorally based
methods such as linguistic and para-linguistic communication,
training, procedures, and self-discipline (e.g. the sterile
cockpit). We have not contrasted the two approaches; the
guidelines in Appendix 1 are directed toward both types.
Most persons concerned with system safety would favor mechanistic
interventions. These methods are less dependent on the quality
and uniformity of human behavior, less vulnerable to lapses, more
predictable throughout, and probably require less effort on the
part of management. In the example of the physical barrier on
the gust lock discussed in Chapter II, a mechanistic approach was
taken because there existed so many opportunities for lapses in
the behaviorally based methods (discipline, training, checklists,
procedures). The outcome of the mechanistic approach was highly
predictable. Barring some very unlikely occurrence, the block on
the Convair's gust lock (Figure II-2a) would prevent the
throttles from being opened to takeoff power with the controls
locked, and it would do it consistently and predictably over the
entire range of operations that one could conceive of. The same
could never be said of any method which depends on
standardization of human behavior.
Unfortunately there is not always a hardware interlock or a
software trap available, and behaviorally based methods must be
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employed, imperfect though they may be. One should approach with
austere caution any intervention that is behaviorally based.
While the well trained and well standardized crew remains the
first line of defense against error, it is also one of the most
unpredictable (see Figure II-l). The tragedy of the Northwest
255 (NTSB, 1988) accident was that behaviorally based and
mechanistic protections failed simultaneously. Had any of the
lines of defense held, the accident would not have occurred.
Crews often impose their own mechanistic interventions to prevent
behavioral errors. These should be regarded as "techniques", or
personalized methods for carrying out standardized procedures
(Degani and Wiener, in preparation). One example involves the
use of the takeoff and landing speed book as a "flag" to indicate
abnormal conditions. Many pilots wish to "hoist a flag" to
remind themselves that an abnormal operation is under way that
requires their attention, such as during fuel transfer,
operations. The pilots place the book between the throttles to
indicate that the transfer valve is open. When the operation is
complete, they close the valve and remove the book. Boeing 737
pilots use the hinged magnetic compass for the same purpose.
During a fuel transfer they rotate it down to the visible
position; after the transfer it is stowed in the "up" position
out of sight.
Here we see the superimposition of a mechanistic device as a
supplement to human memory. It is both amusing and curious that
in an airliner costing over 40 million dollars, this is the best
device to alert the pilot to continue to check fuel balance and
terminate cross-feed operations. One could imagine other
possible solutions, anything from a simple electronic "egg timer"
to automation of the transfer process. Each would have its own
problems.
Another example of creating a mechanistic reminder was observed
by the author during a line flight. The captain had developed a
technique involving a specialized "flag". When he was cleared to
land by the tower, he moved one of the two-position toggle
switches on the ADF control box. After landing, he had a
ritualistic point at which he reset the switch. Resetting the
switch is the crucial operation: one can see in this technique a
golden opportunity for error. This particular memory device is
included in this report as an example, not a recommendation.
Ill-Defined Areas for Intervention
Certain ill-defined areas are generally believed to contribute to
human error, and these may be subject to intervention. These
include such poorly defined, but none the less important,
constructs as fatigue, boredom, monotony, situational awareness,
and complacency, as well as excessive workload. Of these,
workload is the most amenable to intervention, and examples of
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workload reduction and management are discussed elsewhere.
As previously noted in Chapter II, Model B provides the paradigm
for intervention in these ill-defined areas. In these cases the
intervention is not directed at a specific error (e.g. incorrect
waypoint insertion on Route page) or even a class of errors (e.g.
inappropriate choice of autopilot or flight director modes), but
at "human error" in general. The paradigm suggests that if the
offending condition (e.g. fatigue) can be relieved, or the
facilitating condition (e.g. alertness) enhanced, errors in
general will be reduced. But the connection is vague.
The implementation of interventions of this type is difficult for
several reasons. First, the terms themselves are poorly defined
and poorly understood as scientific constructs. Take for
example, "complacency." It is easy to talk about complacency,
and the term enjoys a certain popularity in aviation safety.
ASRS reports are replete with self-remonstrations from pilots who
attribute some specific error to complacency. The error would
not have occurred, in the eyes of the reporter, had he/she not
been complacent. There may be general agreement on a
non-scientific level about what the term means, or at least
implies, but as the author (Wiener, 1981) has pointed out,
"complacency" as a scientific construct lacks operational
definition, and thus is difficult to measure or to attack
experimentally. Intervention strategies for loosely defined and
poorly understood terms will remain the most difficult to design.
Recently R. Parasuraman and his colleagues began the first
organized attempt to understand and quantify complacency,
particularly that portion thought to be induced by over-use of
and over-confidence in automation. Their work is based on the
assumption that complacency is defined by over-confidence (R.
Parasuraman, Molloy, and Singh, 1991; S. Parasuraman, Singh,
Molloy, and R. Parasuraman, 1992).
The reader may find the following exercise instructive: design
an intervention aimed at managing error by reducing complacency,
using Model B.
Fatigue is another construct that is well understood in the minds
of pilots and managers, but less well defined in the minds of
scientists (Graeber, 1988). To many, the warrant for
intervention seems clear: errors occur more frequently when the
operators are tired. As with complacency, many pilots report to
ASRS and perhaps elsewhere that but for their fatigue, this error
would never have occurred.
Applying Model B to "fatigue" is somewhat more tractable than to
"complacency," though the two are often thought of as traveling
companions. In fact, fatigue is often viewed as a causative
agent for complacency. Improvements in crew scheduling are seen
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by pilots as the obvious intervention strategy. This is a
difficult and complex issue, and one beset with strong emotions
and potent economic implications. Only recently has the
scientific community been able to offer schedule builders help
based on experimentation into fatigue (Graeber, 1989; Rosekind,
Gander, Miller, Gregory, McNally, Smith, and Lebacqz, 1993).
Scheduling is not the only candidate for intervention to relieve
fatigue. Another might be napping in the cockpit on long
flights. Although not specifically proscribed under U.S. FARs,
the practice is generally frowned upon. Many pilots think that
cockpit napping is illegal, or at least that such a thing would
be a violation of certain general duty clauses in FAR 91.3.
NASA investigators (Rosekind, Gander, and Dinges, 1991) obtained
special permission from the FAA in order to examine napping in
the cockpit on actual airline flights. The naps were taken in
the cockpit by one crew member at a time, and strictly according
to a pre-arranged schedule. The evidence from this study
strongly suggests that napping can reduce fatigue, defined
operationally as performance on a vigilance task in the cockpit.
It also reduces self-reports of fatigue state. Thus we have the
elements of a Model B intervention: napping reduces fatigue;
reduced fatigue increases vigilance (an early line of defense);
and presumably increasing vigilance reduces errors. The case
could only be improved by having measures of actual errors in the
cockpit as a function of napping regimes versus a control.
In keeping with Guideline Number 4, we note that napping,
particularly in a two-pilot aircraft, is not without risks. It
could increase the probability that both pilots could be asleep
at the same time. It may also reduce the probability.
The NASA fatigue paradigm could be applied to other ill-defined
constructs, boredom and monotony being likely candidates. For
years authors in the area of vigilance have discussed introducing
task-irrelevant stimulation into the work place during long
vigils. On the flight deck, the flight management computer could
be the agent of monotony reduction.
Only a little imagination is needed to conjure up programs that
could be offered to the crew through on-board computers: quiz
shows, sports news, financial programs, games, or perhaps as a
first step, reviews of aircraft systems. This is not without its
perils, and the risks of distraction must be weighed against the
possible gain in monotony management (and therefore, presumably,
error reduction). One can easily imagine an incident or accident
occurring at some distant time in which the probable cause was
determined to be distraction during a monotony management
session. Most of us would probably prefer to answer to charges
of ignoring monotony in the cockpit than to being to author of
such an intervention.
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At this point scientific evidence offers little help: we would
be hard put to quantify either the increase in risk of
distraction or the reduction in monotony, and even more
difficult, their relative effects on the criterion, human error.
Model B interventions can be seen as far more difficult than
those governed by Model A. For example, take a very specific
human error: leaving the center fuel boost pumps on when the
tank has emptied. This error could be attacked in any number of
ways with Model A intervention.
But suppose that this very same error occurred and resulted in a
fuel tank fire. And suppose further that the crew error, as a
result of a thorough investigation, were attributed in part to
one of the ill-defined constructs, perhaps complacency (Wiener,
1981) or fatigue (Graeber, 1988, 1989). The safety investigators
and regulators would find it more than difficult to attack that
portion of the problem. Error management by means of Model B
will remain a challenge for the human factors profession.
In a paper on human vigilance, Wiener (1987a) noted that
following two accidents that might be attributable to lack of
vigilance (NTSB, 1986) the NTSB recommended that the FAA:
"Apply the findings of behavioral research programs and
accident/incident investigations regarding degradation of pilot
performance as a result of automation, and modify pilot training
programs and flight procedures to take full advantage of the
safety benefits of automation technology" (NTSB Recommendation
A-84-123, November 15, 1984).
Wiener later asks his reader: "If you were assigned to the FAA,
and NTSB Safety Recommendation A-84-123 were dropped on your
desk, what steps would you take?"
Emerqinq Technoloqies
In the previous chapter, the potential for intervention through
advanced technologies was discussed. These ranged from fairly
straight-forward, computer-based capabilities to the somewhat
more exotic devices, such as more sophisticated warning and
alerting systems. Many of the interventions discussed could be
easily implemented using today's technologies, both in hardware
and software; they need not await the development of more
sophisticated methods.
Some methods that have been discussed border on artificial
intelligence, for example the concept of goal-sharing
(intent-driven) systems. The ability to deduce that certain
computer inputs, such as waypoints, are not in keeping with the
stated goal of the crew (to fly from a stated origin to a stated
destination) could be done fairly simply. A logical flight path
(course) could be determined, and tolerance limits could be
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established, somewhat like a traditional control chart is used in
industrial quality assurance. If a waypoint falls outside of the
limits, the crew is notified.
Other applications would require either intelligent systems or
elaborate computer programs. Using the previous example, an
incorrect waypoint could be within tolerance for lateral error,
but could result in flight through a military operations area(MOA). An intrusion could be detected if the boundaries of the
MOAs were included in the database (they are not presently), and
if software could check that the course as entered would not
penetrate a MOA. This would require considerably more
programming. In order for machine intelligence to supplement
human intelligence, moreeventualities would have to be
considered, more data stored, and more instructions written and
stored, and of course certified as flight worthy, all of which is
an expensive process.
The next level would involve an attempt to model human
intelligence by computer, and now we have arrived at the doorstep
of artificial intelligence. For such systems to work, they would
have to be programmed to operate at least at the rule-based level
and to truly mimic human intelligence, at the knowledge-based
level. (For a discussion of these levels, see Rasmussen, 1986,
Chapter 9). At the rule-based level, specific interventions may
take place (e.g. the computer would store a rule saying that the
fuel boost pump should not be running in a dry tank) because the
rule is stated. The problem in all rule-based systems is the
vast dimensions of the required set of rules.
For the system to be knowledge-based, the plans would be
continuously compared to the goals which the crew has shared with
the computer. The computer would have to store symbolic
relationships that would mimic human intelligence. In the
example above, the system must "know", as a pilot does, that an
electrical pump running in a fuel tank without fuel as a coolant
would become hot and become a potential fire hazard. It would
"know" this because it, like the human, it knows that electrical
energy converted to mechanical energy generates heat, that
aircraft fuel is generally cool, dissipating heat, and that heat
is a fire/explosion hazard, particularly near combustibles, and
so forth. It would know this for the same reason the reader
knows it: the rotation-heat-fire relationships have been
learned, either through "training" or "experience."
Does artificial intelligence in its full-blown form offer promise
for error intervention? Can AI be developed to detect those rare
cases and conditions that are the stuff that accident reports are
made of, the errors "nobody ever made before?" It is difficult
to say at this early stage in the development of the technology.
There is always the temptation to point to amazing computer
solutions and say, "just turn it over to the computer." As with
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any intervention, the implementation of AI must also be held up
to the guidelines of Appendix I. We must consider the well
established fact that computer-based systems, particularly as
their programs become more exotic, can themselves generate
never-before errors.
We cannot afford to ignore AI as a potential error management
technology. Promising developments in AI applications in combat
aircraft suggest the potential for AI in civil aircraft. In
combat aircraft, AI assists the crew in complex tasks such as
target evaluation, planning, computation of threat-minimizing
routes to and from the target, damage evaluation and control, and
weapons selection.
C. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
Thus far the focus of the discussion has been on the designer and
operator of aircraft. In this section we will explore the role
of governmental authorities, primarily the FAA, in devising and
implementing interventions. We will concentrate on the
regulatory authority of the FAA, and not on its role as operator
of the air traffic control system.
Rule-Makinq Authority
The FAA has the legal responsibility to promote air safety, and
the authority to do so through rule-making and enforcement. As
such, many of the FARs that exist today may have originated as
intervention strategies, some of which were governed by Model A,
some by Model B. The FAA also influences human error through its
certification process, although this appears to be a weak link.
Unfortunately, under FAR Part 25, the only references to human
factors engineering deal with the necessity to conduct workload
analyses in order to certify the aircraft for the size of the
crew for which the design is submitted. There is no FAR
requirement to analyze human error potential, although this may
take place informally during the certification process.
When errors are discovered by the FAA (through accidents,
incidents, check airmen, or FAA's sponsorship of NASA's reporting
system), they may intervene through regulations, or informally
through emphasis on the matter in its various examinations and
inspections of pilots and training centers. They can also
intervene at airlines through their principal operations
inspectors (POIs), who have considerable authority. It is the
POI who must approve training programs, manuals, devices,
procedures, checklists, etc.
Some interventions come as a result of a single accident. The
speed limitation of 250 knots below 10,000 feet (FAR 91.70)
followed the collision of a Constellation and a DC-8 over Staten
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Island in 1960. The DC-8 was flying at almost 500 knots on its
way to Idlewild Airport (now Kennedy), navigating on a single
VOR. The Constellation was flying to LaGuardia.
The speed restriction was thought to make it less likely that an
aircrew could overshoot their clearance limits. In addition, ATC
modified its method of making handoffs from one controller to
another. Previously aircraft were cleared to a fix, at which the
radar clearance actually terminated; then another radar
controller would pick up the target and clear it to the next fix.
Now the radar controller effects a position handoff procedure,
transferring authority for his target to the next controller.
The handoff point does not terminate the clearance.
The sterile cockpit rule (FAR 121.542) has already been cited.
This regulation was the result of a series of accidents in which
investigations revealed less than professional approaches toward
their duties on the part of the crew, as evidenced by casual
conversation during critical flight phases on the cockpit voice
recorder (CVR). This could be regarded as a Model B
intervention: it was not aimed at a specific error in the
cockpit, but a broad area which might be viewed as inattention to
duties, which in turn could be responsible for specific errors
(e.g. altitude deviations; failure to make callouts, failure to
initiate or complete checklists, navigational errors, etc.).
Enforcement and Discipline
The FAA exerts iron-clad discipline over flight crews, with the
authority to levy fines or suspend licenses. For example, the
FAA has recently cracked down on crews moving their airplane out
of the gate or taxiing with a passenger standing in the aisle.
Fines of 1000 dollars can be levied against the captain for such
an action, although, it can be argued, passenger behavior is
often beyond his control. The flight crew depends on the cabin
crew for information on passenger behavior, and often a passenger
will stand up unexpectedly as the aircraft begins to move.
The ATC System
In this section we shall discuss briefly the influence of the ATC
system on human errors in the cockpit. Errors committed by ATC
personnel and opportunities to intervene in these errors are
outside of the scope of this report.
The FAA has the opportunity to intervene to prevent navigational
errors in several ways. They can make changes in:
I. The system itself.
. Procedures by which the system is operated by ATC personnel
(FAA manual 7110.65G).
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3. Cockpit procedures.
An example of the first is related in Wiener (1987b, p. 173). An
incident was reported to the ASRS in which a pilot was cleared to
the TOUTU intersection. After some delay, the pilot called back
to the controller and asked, "Am I cleared to DME 22 miles, or
Flight Level 220 (22,000 feet)?" The pilot had, quite
reasonably, imposed a numerical interpretation on the name TOUTU.
ASRS referred the report to the FAA for possible intervention,"
and the name of the intersection was changed. The incident is
amusing, but it also reveals the vulnerability of the system. It
also illustrates the great value of a reporting system in
bringing potential hazards to the surface where they can be
attacked by interventions. TOUTU intersection no longer exists.
Examples of the second type of intervention available to the FAA
are easily found in linguistic interventions. The use of the
term "cleared" in ATC lexicon was mentioned in Chapter II. An
example of how fragile the system can be to linguistics was
revealed to the author by an airline first officer. He was
flying from San Francisco to Los Angeles with a captain who was
highly familiar with the CIVET approach to Los Angeles (from the
east), but not the present route. As they approached Fillmore
"for theVOR (FIM), the controller cleared them to Los Angeles,
profile descent." The captain did not know that there is a
profile descent ("Runway 24/25") from Fillmore to Los Angeles.
He immediately turned toward CIVET. All the controller had to do
to avoid this confusion was to add the words "Runway 24/25" which
is the standard terminology for this profile descent, or at least
to mention Fillmore, thereby identifying the correct profile
descent.
The third type of intervention can also be illustrated by
linguistic procedures. It is not unheard of for an aircraft
awaiting takeoff clearance to take the clearance of another
aircraft and initiate a takeoff. This is particularly easy to do
when parallel runways are being used for takeoff. As an
intervention to make this less likely, when more than one runway
is in use, tower operators are now required to state the runway
when issuing takeoff instructions (e.g. "American 123, runway
zero-eight right, cleared for takeoff"). The aircraft crew
usually acknowledges in kind, stating the runway along with their
call sign and clearance, but it is not a requirement to do so.
D. SUMMARY
We have discussed the concept of intervention strategies to
prevent, or at least reduce the likelihood of human errors on the
flight deck. A framework consisting of lines of defense, an
intervention paradigm consisting of direct and indirect
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strategies, and a set of guidelines have been provided.
Human error on the flight deck can never been totally eliminated.
However, through judicious design, constant monitoring of
accidents, incidents, and internal reports, and the aggressive
use of reporting systems such as NASA's ASRS, the warrants for
and the means of intervention can be found. Air transportation
enjoys an excellent safety record today largely because no part
of the system is ever allowed to rest.
The need to seize every opportunity to intervene was best
expressed by Gerald Bruggink, a former NTSB investigator, who
wrote, "Aircraft accidents are not caused by villains; they are
allowed to happen by those who fail to see, or use, opportunities
to reduce the likelihood of their occurrence" (1980, p. 6).
Finally, I leave the reader with an assignment. Design a
practical intervention strategy to prevent "once and for all" an
inadvertent no-flap/no-slat takeoff. Attack the problem from any
angle; use any existing methods and technologies, or any methods
that could reasonably be brought into existence. Then test your
solution against the guidelines in Appendix i.
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The term "fleet" has two meanings in the airline industry.
In one sense it has the usual meaning, similar to that of
sea-going vessels, of all of the aircraft of all models and
types in a given company's inventory. The other sense means
all of those aircraft of a given type, including all models
and derivatives, in inventory (e.g. the B-737 fleet). Many
airlines have a management pilot designated as a "fleet
manager" or "fleet captain", consistent with this usage. In
this report, "fleet" usually refers to the latter meaning.
In those cases where the intended meaning is all of the
aircraft operated by an airline, this will be made clear.
A distinction must be made in the case of the DC-9 and the
MD-80 series aircraft. The MD-80 series aircraft are
derivatives of the DC-9; the MD-80 was originally designated
the DC-9-80. In this report the author considers the DC-9
models and the MD-80 series as separate fleets, even though
pilots flying them have a common type rating.
At most airlines which operate both the B-757 and 767, they
are considered one fleet, due to the commonality of their
cockpit.
The units of measure in this report are in feet and miles,
as appropriate to air navigation in the U.S. and most of the
world. For those wishing to convert to metric units, I000
feet approximately equals 300 meters, and one mile
approximately equals 1600 meters.
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It is assumed that the reader is familiar with common
aviation terminology and abbreviations. A glossary of some
of the less familiar abbreviations and acronyms,
particularly those used in the high technology aircraft, is
included in Appendix 4.
The opinions expressed here are those of the author, and not
of any agency, institution, or organization.
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APPENDIX 1
Guidelines for intervention strategies
I .
.
,
,
In proposing an intervention strategy, one should ask "is
this intervention necessary? Is there a well-defined
problem or set of problems that it can prevent or reduce?"
It is not sufficient to justify a proposed intervention by
merely saying that it is "good for safety."
Never implement an intervention or procedure that you feel
that the crews will not follow. (This is similar to the
military dictum of "never give an order that you do not
expect to be carried out").
Politically inspired interventions should be resisted.
Although the motivation and intention of the Congress may be
correct, legislative bodies do not have the technical
expertise to specify and evaluate safety interventions, and
at the very least their solutions may involve technically
infeasible deadlines (e.g. ELT, GPWS, and TCAS). These may
lead to immature hardware and software being installed in
aircraft, with the result that effective intervention is
delayed rather than hastened. This is particularly true in
those cases where Congressional interventions come in the
wake of a tragic accident, and political leaders (and
possibly their constituents) may feel that the FAA and
industry are not moving as quickly as they might.
Any intervention must be carefully examined to ensure that
it does not interfere with other systems, diminish safety
elsewhere, or create a problem for the flight crew or other
personnel. For example, the early models of the
Congressionally mandated emergency locator transmitter (ELT)
beacon, which was legislated into service before the
industry felt that it had been properly tested, contained
batteries that leaked acid and damaged the structure of the
aircraft. Another example is the ever-present temptation to
add items to the aircraft checklist. Expanding a checklist
may decrease the probability that the checklist procedure
will be conducted properly (Degani and Wiener, 1990).
A final example is the traffic alert/collision avoidance
system (TCAS). While the TCAS is undoubtedly a valuable
intervention in collision avoidance hazards, especially in
protecting again VFR traffic, it does create additional
workload and particularly "heads-down" time, which is
already recognized as an undesirable by-product of cockpit
automation. In such a case, a balance of hazards must be
recognized, and secondary interventions may be required,
e.g. restricting some use of TCAS at low altitudes.
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If the intervention strategy involves displays, the
information should be easily interpretable. For example,
the early models of the ground proximity warning system
(GPWS) often created confusion as to which trigger mode was
responsible for the alarm. Later models of the GPWS
improved the situation by identifying alert modes.
Any design, hardware or software, should conform to accepted
standards of human factors. The designer of the
intervention strategy should be mindful of published design
guidelines, whether they are considered official or not (see
Wiener and Curry, 1980 for automation guidelines (reprinted
in Appendix 2 of this report); Degani and Wiener, 1990 for
checklist guidelines (Appendix 3); Williges, Williges, and
Fainter (1988) for guidelines for human-computer interaction
in aviation), and Wickens (1984) for general guidelines for
automated systems.
All interventions should be examined for any adverse effects
on air traffic control (ATC). For example, shortly after
the accident at Los Angeles where a USAir B-737 landed on
top of a Skywest Metroliner awaiting release for takeoff on
Runway 24L, it was suggested that towers discontinue their
practice of allowing an aircraft to "line up and hold" on an
active runway, remaining instead short of the runway until
cleared for takeoff. To do so would impose immense delays
on the system, for a questionable safety benefit. After
reconsideration, this proposal was dropped.
Preferably the intervention strategy should be non-punitive.
It should not place the crew at an added risk of violation
or other punitive action.
The intervention strategy should be economically feasible
and otherwise acceptable to management (e.g. minimize
contractual implications). It should likewise not impose a
cost elsewhere in the overall system (see No. 9).
Wherever possible, the intervention strategy should be
common to all models within a fleet and across fleets within
the same company. When an intervention is recommended or
specified by the manufacturer, or imposed by agencies
outside of a company (e.g. manufacturer, government) it
should be common to all operators of the equipment, wherever
possible.
Examine each proposed intervention and ask if there is an
easier, less invasive, or less costly way to accomplish the
same thing.
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Examine all paperwork associated with an intervention
strategy. Does this paperwork actually aid the crew, or
does it place unnecessary burdens on the crew? Can the
responsibility be assigned elsewhere? If additional
paperwork must be implemented, can its form be made more
pilot-friendly? Can its design be improved?
The intervention strategy should be acceptable to pilots or
other affected personnel. Those who design interventions"
should recognize that frequently changes in flight-deck
regulations and procedures may encounter initial resistance
on the part of many. This can often be avoided, or
ameliorated, by seeking input from those affected, and by
making the reason for the intervention and the potential
benefits clear to those affected (e.g. the sterile cockpit
rule).
Intervention strategies should not be at odds with other
mandated items (e.g. TCAS and GPWSgiving conflicting
vertical commands).
Above all, the intervention strategy should be effective. It
must be demonstrated to achieve the safety gain for which it
was designed. Its effectiveness should be evaluated in
advance by all means possible, including simulation, and
post-intervention evaluations should be conducted. This is
often far easier to do with hardware interventions than more
subtle strategies. For example, though its usefulness is
now generally accepted, what proof do we have that the
sterile cockpit rule has been effective? Compare this to,
let us say, TCAS, where industry could "keep score" on the
number of traffic advisories (TA's) and resolution
advisories (RA's), allowing it to infer the number of
near-midair collisions or collisions avoided.
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APPENDIX 2
Automation Guidelines from Wiener and Curry (1980)
Control Tasks
I. System operation should be easily interpretable or
understandable by the operator, to facilitate the detection
of improper operation and to facilitate the diagnosis of
malfunctions.
2. Design the automatic system to perform the task the way the
user wants it done (consistent with other constraints such
as safety); this may require user control of certain
parameters, such as system gains (see Principle No. 5).
Many users of automated systems find that the systems do not
perform the function in the manner desired by the operator.
For example, autopilots, especially older designs, have too
much "wing waggle" for passenger comfort when tracking
ground based navigation stations. Thus, many airline pilots
do not use this feature, even when traveling coast-to-coast
on non-stop flights.
3. Design the automation to prevent peak levels of task demand
from becoming excessive (this may vary from operator to
operator). System monitoring is not only a legitimate, but
a necessary activity of the human operator; however, it
generally takes second priority to other, event-driven
tasks. Keeping task demand at reasonable levels will ensure
available time for monitoring.
4. For most complex systems, it is very difficult for the
computer to sense when the task demands on the operator are
too high. Thus the operator must be trained and motivated
to use automation as an additional resource (i.e. as a
helper).
5. Desires and needs for automation will vary with operators,
and with time for any one operator. Allow for different
operator "styles" (choice of automation) when feasible.
6. Ensure that overall system performance will be insensitive
to different options, or styles of operation. For example,
the pilot may choose to have the autopilot either fly
pilot-selected headings or track ground-based navigation
stations.
7. Provide a means for checking the set-up and information
input to automatic systems. Many automatic system failures
have been and will continue to be due to set-up error,
rather than hardware failures. The automatic system itself
can check some of the set-up, but independent error-checking
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.equipment/procedures should be provided when appropriate.
Extensive training is required for operators working with
automated equipment, not only to ensure proper operation and
set-up, but to impart a knowledge of correct operation (for
anomaly detection) and malfunction procedures (for diagnosis
and treatment).
Monitorinq Tasks
, Operators should be trained, motivated, and evaluated to
monitor effectively.
i0. If automation reduces task demands to low levels, provide
meaningful duties to maintain operator involvement and
resistance to distraction. Many others have recommended
adding tasks, but it is extremely important that any
additional duties be meaningful (not "make-work") and
directed toward the primary task itself.
ii. Keep false alarm rates within acceptable limits (recognize
the behavioral impact of excessive false alarms).
12. Alarms with more than one mode, or more than one condition
that can trigger the alarm for a mode, must clearly indicate
which condition is responsible for the alarm display.
13. When response time is not critical, most operators will
attempt to check the validity of the alarm. Provide
information in a proper format for that this validity check
can be made quickly and accurately and not become a source
of distraction. Also provide the operator with information
and controls to diagnose the automatic system and warning
system operation. Some of these should be easy, quick
checks of sensors and indicators (such as the familiar
"press to test" for light bulbs); larger systems may require
logic tests.
14. The format of the alarm should indicate the degree of
emergency. Multiple levels of urgency of the same condition
may be beneficial.
15. Devise training techniques and possible training hardware
(including part- and whole-task simulators) to ensure that
flight-crews are exposed to all forms of alerts and to many
of the possible conditions of alerts, and that they
understand how to deal with them.
Copies of this report can be obtained from E. L. Wiener, Box
248237, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124.
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APPENDIX 3
Guidelines for checklist design and implementation
from Degani and Wiener (1990)
In this appendix the authors propose several guidelines for
designing and using flight-deck checklists. These considerations
are not specifications, and some when applied individually may
conflict. Therefore, each should be carefully evaluated for its
relevance to operational constraints and the checklist
philosophy-of-use in any specific airline operation. The section
in the original report which explains the rationale for each
guideline is given in parenthesis.
(i) Every effort should be made to avoid using the checklist as
a "site" for resolving discipline problems. (3.2.3.)
(2) Standardization of checklists between fleets has many
advantages, but this should be done carefully to prevent
inappropriately imposing a checklist sequence and concept of
one aircraft type on another. (3.3.)
(3) Airlines should attempt to standardize the names assigned to
controls and displays between different fleets. (6.2.4.)
(4) Checklist responses should portray the desired status or the
value of the item being considered (not just "checked" or
"set"). (6.2.3.)
(5) The use of hands and fingers to touch appropriate controls,
switches, and displays while conducting the checklist is
recommended. (7.2.2)
(6) The completion call of a task-checklist should be written as
the last item on the checklist, allowing all crew members to
move mentally from the checklist to other activities with
the assurance of all pilots that the task-checklist has been
completed. (5.3.)
(7) A long checklist should be subdivided to smaller
task-checklists or chunks that can be associated with
systems and functions within the cockpit. For example, a
BEFORE START checklist can easily grow to be very lengthy.
If so, it can be subdivided as suggested above. (7.1.1.)
(8) Sequencing of checklist items should follow the
"geographical" organization of the items in the cockpit, and
be performed in a logical flow. Training departments should
provide a pictorial scheme of this flow for training
purposes. (7.1. and 7.2.)
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(9) Checklist items should be sequenced in parallel to internal
and external activities that require input from
out-of-cockpit agents such as cabin crew, ground crew,
fuelers, and gate agents. (7.2., 5.4., and 8.2.2.)
(10) The most critical items on the task-checklist should be
listed as close as possible to the beginning of the
task-checklist, in order to increase the likelihood of
completing the task before interruptions may occur. We note
that this guideline could be in conflict with Nos. (8) and(9) above. In most cases where this occurs, this guideline
(I0) should take precedence. (7.2.)
(II) Critical checklist items such as flaps/slats, trim, etc.,
that might be reset prior to takeoff due to new information
should be duplicated between task-checklists. (7.2.)
(12) Checklists should be designed in such a way that they will
not be tightly coupled with other tasks. Every effort should
be made to provide buffers for recovery from failure, and a
way to "take up the slack" if checklist completion does not
keep pace with the external operation. (8.2.)
(13) The TAXI checklist should be completed as close as possible
to the gate and as far away as possible from the active
runway(s) and adjacent taxiways. (8.2.)
(14) Flight crews should be made aware that the checklist
procedure is highly susceptible to production pressures.
These pressures "set the stage" for errors by encouraging
substandard performance, and later may lead some to relegate
checklist procedures to second level of importance, or not
use them at all in order to save time. (8.2.3.)
(16) FAA officials, particularly Principal Operations Inspectors,
should be sensitive to cultural, traditional, and
philosophical factors in airline companies and their effect
on checklists submitted for their approval. There should be
no compromise, however, regarding the critical "killer"
items. (3.)
(17) Likewise, when a merger occurs, checklists of the acquired
airline should be carefully examined for their differences.
Knowledge gained by the acquired airline in operating a
specific model should not be ignored. Differences in
concepts and operating procedures should be resolved in a
manner that enhances safe checklist behavior of all crew
members. (4.)
Copies of this report can be obtained from A. S. Degani, MS
262-4, NASA-Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA 94035.
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APPENDIX 4
Glossary of abbreviations
ACARS
ADI
AFCS
AI
AOA
AQP
ARINC
ASRS
CDU
CFIT
CRM
CRT
CVR
ECAM
EEC
EFIS
EICAS
ELS
ELT
FAR
FMA
FMC
FMEA
FMS
GPWS
HSI
INS
IRS
IRU
LNAV
LOFT
LOS
MOA
MSAW
PF
PNF
RNAV
TCAS
TMC
VNAV
ARINC communication and reporting system
attitude director indicator
automatic flight control system
artificial intelligence
angle of attack
advanced qualification program
Aeronautical Radio, Inc.
Aviation Safety Reporting System (NASA)
control-display unit
control flight into terrain (accident)
cockpit resource management; crew resource management
cathode ray tube
cockpit voice recorder
electronic centralized aircraft monitor (Airbus)
electronic engine control
electronic flight instrument systems
engine indication and crew alerting system (Boeing)
electronic library system
emergency locator transmitter
federal aviation regulation
flight mode annunciator
flight management computer
failure mode and effects analysis
flight management system
ground proximity warning system
horizontal situation indicator
inertial navigation system
inertial reference system
inertial reference unit
lateral navigation
line oriented flight training
line oriented simulation
military operations area
minimum safe altitude warning
pilot flying
pilot not flying
area navigation
traffic alert/collision avoidance system
thrust management computer
vertical navigation
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